

## Special Report: Engaging Africa's Many Narratives

17<sup>e</sup> SOMMET DE L'UNION AFRICAINE A MALABO



Spanning only three countries, U.S. President Barack Obama's recently concluded trip to Africa was revealing for the number of issues and countries it did not touch on. From growing subregional economic integration, to security and postconflict reconciliation, to deeply problematic governance challenges, this WPR special report reviews a broad range of Africa's many policy challenges.

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# **U.S. and Africa**

# FOR U.S. IN AFRICA, BENIGN NEGLECT NO LONGER AN OPTION

BY RICHARD DOWNIE

08 JAN 2013

Many Africans had big -- and unrealistic -- expectations about the amount of attention they would receive from the United States during President Barack Obama's first term. The administration's approach to Africa was relatively low key compared with the Bush presidency's flurry of big-ticket initiatives on health, development and security, which included the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (Africom). Obama was also less personally engaged on the continent than his predecessor, only setting foot in sub-Saharan Africa for a few hours, very early in his term, to address the Ghanaian Parliament on the importance of good governance.

Below the surface, however, the administration can point to some achievements for which it did not receive sufficient recognition. South Sudan became a new nation with the support of the United States, whose political, economic and technical assistance helped the fledgling country hold a peaceful and credible referendum on independence in January 2011. Diplomatic efforts by outgoing Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson helped resolve electoral disputes in Senegal and set Niger, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire back on the road to democracy. Financial support to the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia helped put the terrorist group al-Shabab on the back foot and laid the foundations for political progress. The tone of U.S. engagement with Africa improved, with stronger emphasis placed on building partnerships of equals and more effort made to listen to African concerns and priorities. The priority in Obama's second term will be to consolidate and expand these efforts to ensure that hard-won gains are not reversed.

On the negative side of the ledger, half-heartedness in tackling the governance deficit in the Democratic Republic of Congo and an unwillingness get tough on the DRC's meddling neighbors meant that the United States was unable to frame a coherent response to renewed violence in the heart of Africa. A military intervention in Libya succeeded in removing Moammar Gadhafi but had a destabilizing impact on security in the whole region and created bad blood with some key U.S. allies in Africa. There was a worrying lurch toward the use of extra-judicial missile strikes to resolve security threats in Somalia. And overall, the record of the United States in advancing the cause of democracy, one of its declared priorities on the continent, was decidedly patchy.

Looking ahead to Obama's second term, it is important to acknowledge that Africa policy will continue to operate within serious resource constraints, which greatly limit opportunities for creative and proactive engagements. Africa is an increasingly important region for the United States but remains low down the list of global priorities. In addition, there will be no letup in the competition the United States faces in Africa from a set of international actors including China, India and Brazil. The new administration will have to work harder than ever to advance its diplomatic, security and economic objectives, and think strategically about what it can offer Africans that others cannot.

In addition to these constraints, a number of security challenges cloud the horizon and will likely cause headaches for the new administration. Top of the list is Mali, where Islamist groups, some linked to al-Qaida, [have seized control of two-thirds of the country](#). Here, the rhetorical U.S. preference for African solutions to African security problems is confronted by the reality that the African forces charged with mounting a military intervention in the coming year are not up to the job. The Obama administration will have to define the parameters of its military support and decide how best to support the mission. It will have to balance its security approach with efforts to resolve the complex political and developmental crises that lie behind Mali's collapse and threaten other neighboring countries in the Sahel.

More broadly, the Obama administration faces decisions about how to shape its security policy in Africa; [define the role of its main implementing agency](#), Africom; and clarify its working relationship with the civilian arms of the U.S. government. When it became operational in 2008, Africom was greeted with suspicion by many African leaders, who feared it would lead to the militarization of U.S. policy on the continent. These suspicions have been allayed over time as the mission quietly got on with its task of helping build the capacity of African militaries. But they are likely to resurface as the U.S. becomes more concerned about the terrorist threat posed by the likes of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali, al-Shabab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria -- and more inclined to intervene directly against such groups. The recent decision to assign additional military resources to Africa, [including a regionally aligned Army brigade](#), could cause disquiet unless its purpose is carefully communicated. African governments are also uneasy about the steady stream of media reports suggesting that more U.S. special operations forces are being deployed on the continent.

Beyond the security arena, a series of political challenges is likely to place obstacles in the path of U.S. objectives to advance good governance and democracy in Africa during Obama's second term. In Kenya, a key U.S. ally, fragile political gains will be severely tested in the coming months as the country approaches presidential elections with memories still fresh of the violence that accompanied the previous electoral cycle in 2007-2008. Voters are also due to go to the polls in Zimbabwe, which has seen far less political progress. The United States has limited ability to influence events in either country, but it can play a positive role on the sidelines with well-timed statements of support for the electoral process, offers of technical assistance and the provision of monitors.

Beyond the immediate political crises, the Obama administration faces the challenge of bringing real meaning to its good governance agenda. Democracy promotion is an important plank of U.S. policy in Africa, but it is hard to operationalize. It also exposes the U.S. to accusations of double standards when it pushes hard for political transitions in countries where it has few strategic interests at stake, such as Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire in recent years, but appears to give a free pass to useful autocrats in Uganda and Rwanda.

Clearly, support for elections will remain an important element of U.S. policy in Africa. In this area, the U.S. could place more emphasis on long-term monitoring. This would involve supporting the growth of electoral institutions and the embedding of electoral norms in an effort to reverse the damaging trend in recent African elections whereby the reflex reaction of losing candidates is to challenge the legitimacy of the vote. But the Obama administration should seek to broaden its good governance agenda to include not only democracy promotion and support for elections but efforts to improve the technical capacity of governments and their supporting institutions. This might usefully include working with legislatures to improve budget processes and oversight mechanisms; reforming procurement systems; and assisting governments with efforts to improve tax collection functions, which help cement the social contract by improving the ability of governments to provide public services and strengthen their legitimacy.

Another area where the United States could help is by engaging with Africa's new energy producers -- countries like Tanzania, Mozambique, Liberia and Sierra Leone, where discoveries of oil and natural gas have the potential to transform economies provided that revenue is spent wisely



and distributed in an equitable manner. The U.S. could offer assistance in setting up accountable and transparent mechanisms for managing natural resource revenues, and improving the capacity of civil society organizations to monitor their governments' stewardship of these valuable national assets.

Africa's current and looming diplomatic and security challenges are tempered by the increasingly optimistic economic picture. Progress is by no means uniform, and many Africans have yet to feel the benefits, but a number of factors justify the bullish economic outlook. They include a decade-long period of sustained growth powered in part by high commodity prices but also including new sectors like banking and telecommunications; improved macroeconomic governance; and the emergence of an African middle class. As a consequence, the timeworn narrative of Africa as a crisis-ridden continent in need of handouts is being urgently updated. Instead, Africa is increasingly being viewed as a place of opportunity and a destination for investors. The United States should reflect this change in its policies, tilting its predominantly crisis-driven approach toward a more proactive Africa agenda that seeks to identify and pursue mutually beneficial opportunities for wealth creation and broad-based development.

Promoting trade and helping improve the investment environment in Africa represent the biggest opportunities for Obama to make an impact in Africa during his second term. Achieving this requires doing more to educate U.S. businesses about the African market and support firms that are willing to invest. Organizing more high-level trade missions to Africa and exposing U.S. investors to potential opportunities are one way to do this, but efforts must also be made to reorganize disconnected U.S. government institutions such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, [the Export-Import Bank of the United States](#) and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency to make them more accessible and useful to U.S. businesses interested in investing in Africa.

Given the fact that the African marketplace is already crowded, the Obama administration should think strategically about where the U.S. has a competitive advantage over China and other big investors. U.S. businesses have the edge over their competitors in terms of reputation, product quality and their desire to invest in training and human capital. A compelling sales pitch should be crafted along these lines to explain to Africans the benefits of doing business with the United States.

Finally, the United States should link its trade promotion and good governance agendas more closely together, assisting African governments in practical initiatives to improve their investment climates. This could include cutting through the red tape required to set up a business; tackling infrastructure deficits such as electricity generation and port capacity; establishing functioning commercial courts; streamlining customs regulations; and removing intra-African barriers to trade. It is by engaging in these kinds of practical efforts that the United States is most likely to improve the lives of ordinary citizens and remain a relevant player on the African continent. □

# U.S. SHOULDN'T OVERCOMMIT TO AFRICAN SECURITY

BY STEVEN METZ  
01 MAY 2013

Africa has never been central to America's global security strategy. From Washington's vantage, the continent has always been less important than Europe, the Pacific Rim, the Middle East or Latin America. The official approach has normally been one of relative indifference with a bit of aid when things got really bad. In the past year, though, several factors have increased the attention being paid to Africa by American policymakers and military leaders.

For starters, the past 10 years have seen significant economic and political progress. While Africa remains the world's poorest continent, its economy [is flourishing](#), potentially providing an opportunity for greater U.S. trade and investment. Then there is growing Chinese involvement. In 2010, China [surpassed the United States](#) as Africa's top trading partner. Eventually this economic leverage may translate into strategic influence. But most of all, U.S. concern for Africa has been sparked by the expansion of Islamic extremism, as [demonstrated by Boko Haram's rise in Nigeria](#) and the takeover of much of northern Mali by violent extremists, some affiliated with al-Qaida.

Concerned by these trends, the United States has tentatively moved toward a more active role in African security. Washington provided some support to the French military forces that intervened in Mali. With France [contemplating leaving a military force in that country](#) and the United Nations [approving a peacekeeping mission](#), Sens. John McCain and Carl Levin wrote to President Barack Obama asking for increased help to the government of Mali. In recent months, the "Dagger" Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division became one of the U.S. Army's first "regionally aligned forces" and [kicked off an expanded program](#) of capacity building and exercises with African armed forces. And in February, the United States announced that it [is establishing a drone base in Niger](#) to monitor extremist organizations.

The question now is whether all of this is the bow wave of a long-term trend toward increased U.S. involvement in African security. History suggests it is not. American strategy in Africa has long been dominated by persistent missteps and occasional grievous errors. For instance, Washington initially opposed African decolonization, fearing it would weaken America's NATO allies with possessions there. Then for decades the United States treated Africa as a Cold War battleground, opposing all left-leaning organizations and leaders, which included most anti-colonial nationalists, and instead relying on the former European colonial powers or anti-communist dictators like Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko and South Africa's white minority regime to counter Soviet and Chinese influence.

After the Cold War, the United States did back away from friendly dictators and the apartheid regimes, but by then past support for them had created a wellspring of mistrust and antagonism in Africa. Washington attempted to repair the damage and build more equitable partnerships through initiatives like the African Crisis Response Initiative and [African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance](#) program, which augmented the capacity of African militaries, and

by fostering development through the [African Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000](#). The George W. Bush administration continued this approach by implementing the [President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief](#) and the [Millennium Challenge Corporation](#), which provided poverty and policy-improvement assistance to nations that met good governance criteria.

But after Sept. 11, U.S. security strategy in Africa was overwhelmingly shaped by the struggle against Islamic extremism and terrorism. The centerpieces were the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative, in which U.S. military and civilian agencies helped African security forces attempt to control their national territories, and the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, which countered extremism emerging from Somalia. Then, in 2008, the Defense Department centralized its Africa efforts by activating the U.S. Africa Command. Unlike the other regional commands, which were created primarily for warfighting, the Africa Command was specifically designed to support regional partners. It thus included large components from other government agencies like the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Despite all of this, there are serious impediments to a greater role in Africa for the United States and particularly the U.S. military. One is the legacy of suspicion, some of it earned by past American mistakes, some of it reflecting a propensity for conspiracy theories and scapegoating. The idea remains widespread that the United States wants to keep Africa weak and unstable to assure access to critical minerals. Africa's recent economic growth, while impressive, is in a race with rapidly expanding populations -- 14 of the world's top 20 nations with the highest population growth rates are in Africa. Creating enough jobs to avoid a large cadre of angry youth vulnerable to recruitment by extremists will be a challenge. At the same time, Africa's underdeveloped and underfunded infrastructure, education and health care systems create barriers to accelerated economic growth.

Despite some progress, Africa is still encumbered by political cultures based on ethnicity, religion or regionalism and a tendency for political power to be exploited for patronage and personal enrichment. In many African nations, corruption by political leaders strangles economic development. Angola and Nigeria, Africa's two major petroleum producers, are among the world's poorest countries, and corrupt leaders in those states have stolen untold billions of dollars. In Transparency International's latest corruption perception rankings, [9 of the bottom 20 countries were African](#). The continent has made great strides in democratization, but peaceful power transitions and the sustaining institutions of democracy, such as political interest groups, independent judiciaries and a free press, remain in short supply. As Scott B. MacDonald [noted in World Politics Review](#), continued economic growth in Africa depends on improved governance. And better governance is not guaranteed.

In the security realm, Africa has a number of highly professional militaries, but most remain weak in intelligence, planning, logistics, transportation and maintenance. In many of the region's armies, poor pay and the absence of a retirement system motivate corruption or predation. Mali showed that even militaries that receive external training and assistance are often riven by factions. Such brittle forces can shatter easily when facing political or economic challenges. And, as Lesley Anne Warner of the National Defense University points out, transnational organized crime [is increasingly corrupting government and military officials](#), particularly in West Africa. Guinea Bissau [is already a criminal state](#), and others may follow suit.

While the spread of violent Islamic extremism in Africa is troubling, the United States cannot eradicate it at a reasonable cost. Some of the most threatened nations, such as Nigeria, stridently resist increased American involvement. Ultimately, U.S. strategy in Africa can only change slowly and in small steps. Certainly the United States should continue to help partners, whether African or European, prevent the outright takeover of a nation, as nearly happened in Mali. Assistance to the militaries of Africa's democratic states remains worthwhile.

But America should steadfastly avoid relying on ties to a particular African regime rather than to a nation. It should not treat Africa as a field of competition with China. And most of all, Washing-

ton should not expect too much. At least for several more decades, Africa will continue its pattern of modest economic and political progress punctuated, unfortunately, with setbacks, conflicts and disasters. A step-and-a-half forward will be followed by a step back. At some point, the U.S. role in Africa may expand. But that time is not now. □

# U.S. MUST STRIKE DIFFICULT BALANCE ON WEST AFRICA'S TERRORIST THREAT

BY ALEX THURSTON

17 JUN 2013

Since Mali's current crisis began in 2012, West Africa's terrorist movements have generated sustained and intense international concern. On June 3, the U.S. State Department's Rewards for Justice Program [announced its](#) "first reward offers for terrorists in West Africa." Bounties ranged from \$3 million to \$5 million for commanders in al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), and \$7 million for Abubakar Shekau, the formal leader of the Nigerian Muslim sect Boko Haram. Rewards for Justice, [its website explains](#), exists to incentivize the release of information that helps prevent "international terrorist acts" or punish their perpetrators.

The men named are undoubtedly dangerous—but are they international threats? The State Department has moved cautiously on issues of terrorism in West Africa, for example by designating several individuals in Boko Haram as international terrorists but refraining, for the time being, from so designating the entire movement. Yet from other quarters, there is a danger of unfounded alarmism regarding radicalization in West Africa and the globalization of its violent movements. The media has frequently peddled the image of an "arc of instability" stretching across the Sahel, or even more simplistic images of a Muslim Africa at war with a Christian Africa. In this atmosphere, groups like AQIM, MUJWA and Boko Haram merit serious attention, but real questions remain concerning their capacities, ranges and limitations.

For one thing, as Western policymakers construct and reconstruct "maps" of global terrorism, it is worth asking to what extent metaphors originating from the experience of Afghanistan apply to West Africa. For the past decade and more, security analysts have frequently argued that the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, resulted from international terrorists' ability to train for and plan operations in an "ungoverned space," namely Afghanistan. Other ungoverned spaces, the argument often continues, offer "safe havens" to terrorists and therefore threaten the security of the United States. Since at least 2004, [analysts have argued](#) that parts of West Africa, particularly Nigeria and the western Sahel region, [constitute the same kind of dangerous, ungoverned spaces](#)—"breeding grounds," as an oft-used metaphor puts it, for extremism. The violence caused by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria beginning in 2003, and more systematically since 2010, along with the seizure of power in northern Mali by AQIM, MUJWA and the Ansar al-Din movement in 2012, could be taken as confirmation of grim predictions from the early 2000s concerning West Africa's vulnerability to global terrorist predations.

But how serious of an international threat do West African terrorist movements pose? The answer depends partly on how one defines "international," and partly on how one calculates probabilities. Regarding the first part of this formula, West African terrorist groups undeniably cross borders within their sub-regions in their recruitment and activities. MUJWA, operating primarily in Mali, is formally headed by a Mauritanian national, Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheiry. Suspected Boko Haram members have been arrested in Niger, and some analysts believe Boko Haram was present

in northern Mali during the period of Islamist rule in 2012. West and North African terrorists also share common rhetoric and ideology with each other and global terrorists, as AQIM's use of the "al-Qaida" moniker and references to Boko Haram in propaganda demonstrate. Groups claiming responsibility for recent attacks in Algeria in January and Niger in May have invoked the French intervention in Mali as justification. If "international" means crossing borders, terrorism in West Africa is international.

If "international" means targeting the West, however, the answer is less clear. It is hard to argue confidently that Northwest African terrorist groups are likely to attack Paris, London or Washington. Both Boko Haram and AQIM have threatened the West, kidnapped Westerners and attacked international targets—in both cases, United Nations buildings, and in AQIM's case several embassies in Mauritania. The Armed Islamic Group, an Algerian forerunner of AQIM, hijacked an Air France flight in 1994. January's attack on an Algerian energy facility by an AQIM splinter group, and the May bombings in northern Niger claimed by MUJWA, among others, partly struck at Western economic interests. But does that mean one of these groups will detonate a bomb in a Western capital? Given that these movements are perennially harried by security forces, prone to fragmentation and operating in hostile and unpredictable environments, their chances of striking a Western city appear slim. There is also the question of priorities: Boko Haram's primary grievances concern Nigeria's government and local Christians. AQIM has invested its energies into attacking targets in the land of its birth, Algeria, and expanding its activities in the Sahel.

For Western security professionals, there are many incentives to overstate the threats such groups pose to the West, and few incentives to downplay them. An analyst who predicts an attack that does not materialize can always point to the possibility that such an attack will occur later, but the analyst who fails to predict an attack that does occur may face professional consequences. Predicting threats and highlighting risks makes headlines; saying that terrorist threats are declining may elicit skepticism.

Once security professionals embrace frameworks that treat any local terrorism as a potential precursor to international terrorism, moreover, certain ramifications follow. Isolated events, such as a Nigerian's amateurish attempt to bomb an inbound U.S. flight in December 2009, can appear as harbingers of more systematic terrorist ambitions. Murky incidents, such as a recent attempted jailbreak by armed prisoners in Niger, variously identified in the international press as MUJWA or Boko Haram members, can furnish alleged evidence of terrorist groups' expanding range. And anti-Western rhetoric coming from Boko Haram propaganda videos may appear to analysts as genuine threats, rather than mere rhetorical posturing. The assumptions security professionals make profoundly shape their interpretations of what constitutes a serious threat of international terrorism.

Violence in West Africa is dragging on, [from the stabilization of northern Mali](#) to the [ongoing military struggle with Boko Haram](#) in northeastern Nigeria. In this climate, security professionals will continue to face dilemmas regarding what weight to attribute to the "local" versus the "international" aspects of different terrorist groups in the region. Resisting alarmism will help them strike a more accurate balance. □

# WALKING THE LINE: U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN EAST AFRICA AND THE HORN

BY DAVID H. SHINN  
20 FEB 2013

Until the end of the Cold War in the late-1980s, U.S. policy in East Africa and the Horn tried to balance regional security concerns with support for economic development and mitigating food shortages and famines. The primary goal of U.S. policy in the region was to minimize Soviet influence and that of China, Eastern Europe and Cuba. As the Cold War came to an end, the United States added to its policy agenda the objectives of encouraging democratic governance and improving human rights practices.

In the post-Cold War era, the primary U.S. human rights and governance concerns in the region have been the lack of transparent elections that allow meaningful participation by the opposition; the arrest of prominent opposition political leaders and journalists; corruption and discrimination against marginalized groups. Having belatedly condemned the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the U.S. was the only country to declare that genocide occurred in Darfur, after which Washington led the condemnation of the government of Sudan.

Overall, however, the United States demonstrated relatively little interest in the region until the 1998 al-Qaida attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Since then, and especially after the Sept. 11, 2001, al-Qaida attacks on the U.S., counterterrorism has dominated the U.S. policy agenda in the region, though not to the exclusion of other priorities. The United States has been the single largest source of emergency food aid in times of need, for instance, and has done more to combat HIV and AIDS than any other country. It has also maintained significant development aid programs in most countries in East Africa and the Horn. All of these programs have, however, been implemented with an eye on the impact of both international terrorism and political instability to U.S. interests in the region and even the homeland.

These security interests often conflict with U.S. policy that encourages democratization and more attention to human rights. As a result, human rights groups, which have the luxury of being able to ignore U.S. security and political interests, continue to be generally critical of U.S. human rights policy in the region, especially as there has been little change in the overall approach of countries in the region to either issue. Whatever occasional progress has occurred has usually been offset by new negative developments.

Nevertheless, it is easier to document the U.S. security assistance and aid relationship with countries in the region than the U.S. response to concerns about human rights and democratization. The annual [State Department human rights report on individual countries](#) is one unusually comprehensive and frank source of such criticisms, and it often results in blowback from political leaders in the countries being criticized. There are also ad hoc public statements on human rights and governance abuses in these countries. But much of the dialogue on these issues is done confidentially and at a high level, both in foreign capitals and in Washington, and the public normally does not learn about it until long after interest in the matter has passed.

In recent years, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda in particular have been central to U.S. security policy objectives in the region, while Rwanda has been important for other reasons. All of these countries demonstrate the fine policy line that the United States is walking as it actively seeks the support of their governments, which exercise varying degrees of repression.

## THE UNITED STATES LEANS ON ETHIOPIA FOR SECURITY HEAVY LIFTING

The United States has a long security relationship with Ethiopia that began during World War II and became much stronger in the postwar period, when the United States was the major supplier of military equipment and training to Ethiopia. Relations deteriorated quickly, however, after Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown by a left-leaning military junta in 1974. The United States terminated its military assistance to Ethiopia soon thereafter, and the Soviet Union moved in to fill the vacuum. Though U.S.-Ethiopia relations improved when the Derg regime that had replaced Selassie was in turn overthrown in 1991, Washington never resumed the large military assistance program that it had provided to Selassie.

Ethiopian forces have since participated in international peacekeeping missions in Rwanda, Liberia, Darfur, South Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire. In 2011, Ethiopia, encouraged by the United States, took exclusive responsibility for providing troops for the U.N. Interim Force for Abyei inside Sudan along the border with South Sudan.

Ethiopia is moreover a major ally of the United States in regional counterterrorism efforts, especially in Somalia. Though there is continuing debate about Washington's role in Ethiopia's decision to send troops into Somalia in late-2006, the United States' ongoing intelligence cooperation with Ethiopia almost certainly supported the operation. Whatever the degree of collaboration, Ethiopia subsequently allowed the United States to locate a small drone-surveillance station at Arba Minch in southwestern Ethiopia to monitor developments in Somalia.

Ethiopia was eligible for up to \$843,000 in its foreign military financing program and \$575,000 in military education and training program in fiscal year 2012, although figures are not available for the amounts actually disbursed, which could be lower than the allocations. These funds are contingent on the secretary of state's certification, which has been given, that Ethiopia is implementing policies to respect due process and freedoms of expression and association, and is permitting access to human rights and humanitarian organizations to Ethiopia's Somali region. The Global Security Contingency Fund also authorized for use between fiscal year 2012 and 2015 up to \$75 million to be shared by the African Union Mission in Somalia and border security forces of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya to conduct counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida, its affiliates and al-Shabab.

Ethiopia's cooperation in counterterrorism and peacekeeping comes against the backdrop of one of the largest U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs in Africa, which totaled \$696 million in fiscal year 2011 and \$541 million in fiscal year 2012. About half this total was devoted to food aid, with other major programs for maternal child and reproductive health care, combating HIV and AIDS, malaria control, agricultural development and basic education. The United States funneled additional aid to Ethiopia through international organizations, especially for combating HIV and AIDS.

Washington has tried to balance Ethiopia's importance to regional stability, counterterrorism and peacekeeping against Addis Ababa's reluctance to democratize and improve its human rights record. For example, Washington has publicly criticized Ethiopia's decision to expel Eritreans living in Ethiopia following the outbreak of conflict with Eritrea in 1998; violence in the aftermath of Ethiopia's 2005 national elections; and the arrest of journalists and several members of the political opposition. The State Department's 2011 report on human rights practices in Ethiopia cited among the most significant problems restrictions on civil society and nongovernmental organizations, arbitrary arrest of political opponents and lack of freedom of the press.



It is too early to judge whether Ethiopia's approach to human rights and governance will change significantly as a result of [the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi](#) in August 2012. Human Rights Watch's "World Report 2013" concluded that it remains to be seen whether the government under the new prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, will undertake human rights reforms. The Hailemariam government did release several journalists from detention, but the broad outlines of Ethiopia's human rights policy have so far continued as before.

## DJIBOUTI HOSTS THE ONLY U.S. MILITARY BASE IN AFRICA

Djibouti, one of the smallest countries in Africa, is unique in hosting the only U.S. military base on the continent. Though previously overlooked, the country became important to Washington when U.S. policy in the region began to focus on counterterrorism. In late-2002, 400 troops from the 2nd Marine Division joined 900 U.S. personnel already operating in Djibouti to create Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). By May 2003, the task force took possession of a former French Foreign Legion base known as Camp Lemonnier.

Today, about 3,200 troops, civilians and contractors are assigned to Camp Lemonnier, where they train foreign militaries, gather intelligence, operate drones and distribute some humanitarian assistance to countries throughout the region. CJTF-HOA is the centerpiece of an expanding number of small U.S. drone and fixed-wing surveillance operations in Africa to monitor terrorist groups and pirates off Somalia. In late-2011, the United States increased the airpower at CJTF-HOA by stationing a squadron of F-15E Strike Eagle fighter aircraft there. In recent years, the United States has paid the government of Djibouti between \$30 million and \$40 million annually as rent for the base.

At the same time, Djibouti received only about \$3 million in USAID assistance, for the health and education sectors, in fiscal year 2012, about half the amount it received in fiscal year 2010. Djibouti was eligible for \$1.5 million in foreign military financing and \$335,000 in military education and training funds in the same fiscal year, and is eligible for money from the Global Security Contingency Fund.

Djibouti has attracted much less attention than Ethiopia for its human rights and governance practices. This is due in part to its better record, but also to the fact that it is a small country with almost no diaspora in the United States. The State Department's 2011 report on human rights practices cited the most serious problems as Djibouti's harassment, abuse and detention of government critics and its unwillingness to permit its people access to independent sources of information. The current president, Ismail Omar Guelleh, won a third term in 2010, in an election boycotted by the principal opposition after Guelleh had parliament amend the constitution to remove a two-term limit.

Human Rights Watch has criticized the cancellation of term limits and faulted the government for "repeatedly" preventing protest rallies and harassing the political opposition. It has also pointed out that Djibouti's blanket ban on demonstrations contravenes Article 15 of its constitution. Amnesty International has chided Djibouti for restricting freedom of expression, preventing the operation of trade unions and harassing human rights defenders. But as CJTF-HOA has grown in importance to the regional counterterrorism effort, concerns about human rights and good governance clearly will not be permitted to disrupt the close U.S. security relationship with Djibouti.

## KENYA IS THE STAGING LOCATION OF CHOICE

The United States has a long and cooperative relationship with Kenya, and despite regular dustups over elections and governance issues, Kenya has a better human rights record than most countries in the region. Moreover, it has always been supportive of U.S. humanitarian operations, including in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for which the port city of Mombasa has served as a major staging ground. Kenya has also worked closely with Washington to combat terrorism and piracy in the region, especially in and around Somalia.

USAID assistance to Kenya in fiscal year 2012 totaled \$223 million, mostly for health and economic development, down sharply from the previous three years. Almost \$10 million went to the peace and security sector, which included counterterrorism and conflict mitigation. Kenya was eligible in fiscal year 2012 for \$1.5 million in foreign military financing and \$890,000 in military education and training funds. It is also eligible for money from the Global Security Contingency Fund and in fiscal year 2012 received an estimated \$7.75 million in anti-terrorism assistance and \$850,000 in counterterrorism financing.

While Kenya has a good press freedom record and a parliament that plays an active role in politics, the State Department's 2011 report on human rights practices hits a harsh note by singling out abuses by security forces, including unlawful killings, torture, rape and the use of excessive force. The report also identifies the abridgement of the right of citizens to change their government in the 2007 elections, which [were followed by mob violence](#).

President Barack Obama recently issued a video message urging Kenya to make sure that upcoming elections on March 4 are free and fair. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson subsequently stated that the elections offer a “wonderful opportunity” for Kenya to demonstrate to the world the vitality of its democracy. When the press asked Carson about the U.S. position on presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta and his running mate William Ruto, both of whom have been charged by the International Criminal Court with crimes against humanity following the violence-plagued 2007 elections, Carson responded that Kenya's leaders must be held accountable for election-related violence and that “choices have consequences.”

The March elections will show whether or not Kenya has made progress on democracy consolidation since 2007. Regardless, the United States will remain dependent on Kenya for logistical cooperation in the event of new humanitarian emergencies in the region, mitigating against any significant pressure based on human rights concerns.

## UGANDA IMPACTS STABILITY IN SOUTH SUDAN AND CENTRAL AFRICA

While Uganda is somewhat less important to the United States for security reasons than the other countries discussed here, it did support U.S. objectives in the period preceding the independence of South Sudan by offering strong backing for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. It also provided an air support base at Entebbe for the massive U.S. relief effort of Rwandan refugees in the eastern DRC in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.

More recently, in 2011, the United States sent some 100 noncombatant military advisers to help track down and [neutralize Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army](#) (LRA), which once operated from northern Uganda and now divides its time between South Sudan and the Central African Republic. The United States authorized up to \$35 million annually to fund this effort, with American troops providing intelligence support to about 1,500 Ugandan soldiers deployed in both the Central African Republic and South Sudan. This contribution is arguably not so much in U.S. security interests as it is a humanitarian action on behalf of Africans adversely affected by the LRA.

Uganda is also a significant recipient of USAID assistance. In fiscal year 2012, USAID programs for Uganda totaled \$210 million, almost half of it to the health sector, down marginally from the previous three years. Some \$5 million went to the peace and security sector to counter terrorism and mitigate conflict. Uganda was eligible for \$200,000 in foreign military financing in fiscal year 2012, although the financing was subject to restrictions if the secretary of state had credible information that Uganda was supporting armed groups in the DRC involved in mineral smuggling or human rights violations. Uganda was also allocated \$600,000 in military education and training and authorized to receive \$5 million from the Economic Support Fund (ESF), the only country of the five discussed here eligible for ESF funding.

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has ruled the country since 1986. He opposes term limits

but says he accepts the constitutional provision that does not allow a person to rule past his or her 75th birthday. (Museveni says he was born in 1944.) Museveni [cracked down hard on the political opposition](#) following his swearing-in for a fourth term in 2011. The International Crisis Group concluded last year that the main cause of social unrest in Uganda is the gradual shift from constitutional-style government to patronage-based, personal rule. Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have been highly critical of the government's intimidation of civil society and restrictions on freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.

Meanwhile, the State Department's 2011 human rights report listed three important concerns: lack of respect for the integrity of the person (including unlawful killings, torture and other abuses of detainees), unwarranted restrictions on civil liberties and violence and discrimination against marginalized groups.

But Museveni has considerable leverage over the United States, due to Uganda's involvement in stabilizing Somalia. In 2007, Uganda was the first country to deploy troops for the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia after Ethiopian troops defeated the Islamic Courts militia, and its troops subsequently played a key role in defeating al-Shabab in the Mogadishu area. Ugandan and Burundian forces had sole responsibility for security in Mogadishu after Ethiopian troops left in January 2009, and Uganda continues to maintain the largest troop presence there now. The U.S. fully supported this mission and helped train and finance the Ugandan force.

### RWANDA'S SECURITY INTEREST BASED ON NEGATIVE ROLE IT CAN PLAY

Small, land-locked Rwanda is not strategically important to the United States, but Washington, in its dealings with the country, is still driven by feelings of residual guilt for failing to even try to stem the carnage during the 1994 genocide. There is also considerable respect for President Paul Kagame's success in maintaining political stability and achieving substantial economic development.

The result has been U.S. political support for Rwanda and modest tangible assistance. In fiscal year 2012, the USAID program totaled \$101 million, down somewhat from the three previous years, most of it for health and economic development. During this period, Rwanda was eligible for \$200,000 in foreign military financing, with the same caveat as that attached to Uganda's funding, and \$500,000 in military education and training funds. After members of Congress and U.S. human rights groups urged Obama to get tough with Kagame [for reportedly supporting the M23 rebel group](#) in the eastern DRC, Obama called Kagame and urged him to end any support for the group. Washington subsequently suspended some military aid to Rwanda.

The 2011 State Department human rights report is tough on Rwanda. It highlights illegal detention, torture and disappearance of persons detained by state security forces; a lack of freedom of speech and of the press; and societal violence and discrimination against women and children as the biggest problems. Amnesty International has more specifically criticized Kagame for restricting freedom of expression and association before presidential elections, shutting down media outlets that were critical of Kagame and intimidating human rights defenders. It also charged that high-ranking military officers were detained without trial.

Because Rwanda is less important to U.S. security interests in the region, except in the sense of not aggravating the situation in the DRC, Washington has more leverage with Kagame to advance a human rights agenda than with the leaders of the other nations discussed here.

### WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

The countries discussed here welcome security cooperation with the United States, which helps them address their own security threats, real or perceived, and in several cases probably contributes to the government's ability to retain power. Not surprisingly, none of them relishes the annual

criticism in the State Department's human rights report or ad hoc public criticism from Washington. On occasion, they deny the charges and even push back. While human rights-related criticism is an irritant in each of these countries' relationships with the U.S., their governments understand why Washington speaks out on democracy and human rights, even if they question the consistency and fairness of U.S. criticism when compared with U.S. policy toward other countries in the world.

Western human rights organizations and advocates have long been critical of the leaders of all the governments discussed here. They have also frequently expressed the belief that the U.S. government has not applied enough pressure to these leaders to improve human rights practices and democratize faster. Human rights advocates tend to have the most success when they collectively focus on a particular political prisoner or narrow issue. But because they have been so critical on a wide range of issues in the region for so many years, African leaders tend to tune them out, and even U.S. officials become numbed by the constant refrain.

China and Russia, by contrast, do not attach political strings to their assistance, and they eschew criticism of African human rights and governance practices. They are also more willing than the U.S. to transfer untold quantities of weapons to countries with questionable records on human rights and governance. Even a democracy such as India avoids criticizing egregious human rights and governance practices in Africa. This leaves only the United States, the European Union, Canada, Norway, Australia and a few others to convey bad news and experience the repercussions.

Washington needs to be sure that security cooperation with these countries is truly useful and be more consistent in its global efforts to support improved human rights and governance practices. But in view of continuing strong support for better human rights and democratization, on the one hand, and Washington's need for cooperation from these countries on countering terrorism and threats such as piracy, international crime and narcotics trafficking, on the other, U.S. relations with the countries of East Africa and the Horn present a dilemma to which there is no simple solution. The fact is that, since the end of the Cold War, concerns about political stability, security and countering terrorism in the region have usually trumped concerns about human rights practices and good governance. □



# **Politics, Development and Governance**

# TO MAINTAIN GROWTH, AFRICA MUST IMPROVE GOVERNANCE

BY SCOTT B. MACDONALD

11 APR 2013

A small sea of ink has been spilled lately over the “rise of Africa” as an exciting frontier market for investors from both advanced economies and other emerging markets. Africa’s relatively rapid growth rates, improved fiscal and debt management and improving political stability are painting a picture of the kind of robust economic prospects usually associated with India, China, Brazil and other middle-income economies. And despite remaining high risks associated with African markets, global investors increasingly find Africa’s potential returns compelling.

For example, according to a study by the Boston Consulting Group, a hypothetical \$100 investment in Africa’s 40 largest listed companies by market capitalization in 1999 would have been worth more than \$900 by November 2009. More recently, stronger global macroeconomic fundamentals and increased risk appetite among investors mean more capital is likely to flow to emerging markets -- a projected \$1.12 trillion worth in 2013, up from an estimated \$1.08 trillion in 2012, according to the Washington-based Institute of International Finance -- with Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, considered a “hot spot” for such investment.

But the big question looming over Africa’s increasing attraction to investors is whether the region’s current growth spurt and related investor interest are sustainable. The answer is straightforward. Africa is on the right track and has the potential to enhance its economic makeover, but the process faces considerable challenges.

Not least among these is how African leaders balance external forces with the need to provide a better standard of living for the majority of their citizens. Over the past decade, Americans, Chinese, Europeans and others [have sought out the continent’s natural resources](#) in what was a long commodity bull market. Indeed, the continent [has some of the world’s largest known reserves](#) of diamonds, gold, uranium, oil and gas. It also has three other critical resources: large and still relatively untapped timberlands, the world’s largest amount of unexploited arable land -- most of it in sub-Saharan Africa -- and water. Arable land in particular is an increasingly strategic asset in a world where food crises are becoming recurrent. Countries that are looking to the future and harbor concerns about the growth of the global population -- which may reach up to 9.3 billion by 2050, according to the United Nations -- [are buying up land](#) in Angola, Mozambique and other countries with sizeable tracts of arable land.

There is more to Africa’s rise on the investor landscape, however, than a bounty of natural resources. After the volatile 1980s and early 1990s, much of Africa made significant gains in economic growth, partially due to a significant reduction of civil wars over the past 10 years or so. Although places like Somalia, the [Democratic Republic of the Congo](#) (DRC) and most lately [the Sahel](#) have continued to suffer from political, ethnic and religious conflict, a number of longstanding wars elsewhere in Africa have ended. African regional organizations, such as the African Union, the East African Community and the African Development Bank have all played a more proactive and

stabilizing role than in the past, which has complemented better economic policymaking.

All of this has allowed a greater and consistent focus on economic development, including important advancements in the standard of living. To be certain, poverty remains high, but it has declined from its highest level of 59 percent of the population in 1996 to about 50 percent in 2011. At the same time, the fight against malaria, HIV and AIDS through mosquito nets and antiretroviral drugs has radically reduced deaths from these pandemics.

Africa is set to enjoy even stronger growth in 2013 and 2014 compared to recent years. Sub-Saharan Africa itself is expected to grow by 5.8 percent in 2013 and 5.7 percent in 2014, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While not as robust a pace as that of non-Japan Asia, it places sub-Saharan Africa ahead of Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and the advanced economies. Considering Africa's political and economic development track record, the IMF forecasts indicate considerable progress and are based on an improving trade and investment outlook.

Yet while the positive factors point to a considerably improved position for Africa on its long economic development cycle, there are also negative factors that cast doubt over the sustainability of its current trajectory. These include region-wide chronic corruption problems; weak political institutions in many countries, such as the DRC, Mali and Guinea-Bissau; poor and inadequate infrastructure; a lag in the growth of real GDP, both overall and per capita; and vulnerability to climate change.

Consequently, global investors face a daunting task in terms of weighing yield against risk. Slow growth in the advanced economies, greater market volatility and a lengthy list of risk factors are pushing investors to look beyond traditional markets for equities and debt, to frontier markets like Africa. In many ways, global investors have little choice but to consider investing in Africa, either through a transnational company involved in business there or through funds that invest in local stock exchanges and companies. At the same time, Africa needs capital and a better ability to put capital to work more effectively, especially when the commodity boom fades in a more pronounced way.

Yet, to continue to grow, African leaders and policymakers will be forced to make difficult decisions about institution-building, government accountability and how to make certain their citizens share in the economic and political processes and successes. The Roman statesman Seneca is said to have observed, "If one does not know to which port one is sailing, no wind is favorable." African leaders and global investors should know that the port they should be sailing to is that of economic sustainability. □

# FOR EAC, TRADE STILL OUT AHEAD OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION

BY RICHARD DOWNIE

06 JUN 2013

The recent buzz about Africa's economic progress and potential has aroused long-overdue interest from investors. While the bullish mood is largely justified, it should not obscure the fact that many institutional, infrastructural and policy barriers limit the scope for transformational growth. One of the most serious is that African markets are not sufficiently open. African countries simply do not trade enough with each other. This has huge consequences for a continent where 15 countries are landlocked and where colonial-era boundaries have produced many small, resource-poor nations that are not economically viable by themselves.

Some African countries have begun to address this by allowing the freer movement of goods, capital, people and services within their region. Regional integration has the potential to unlock markets, provide economies of scale, increase competition among firms and attract more foreign direct investment. The most impressive progress to date [has been made by the East African Community](#) (EAC), a customs union and trading bloc comprising Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. The current EAC, formed in 2000, revives and expands an earlier attempt at regional integration that collapsed in 1977 amid political rivalries.

The plans are ambitious: The EAC's leaders are [aiming for a common market](#), a single currency called the East African shilling and, ultimately, federation into a single state. Later this month, a more modest but nonetheless significant milestone will be reached when the East African passport, launched in 2009, will be formally recognized as a valid document for travel outside, as well as inside, the EAC. A common tourist visa for the region is set to follow.

The impact of regional integration is beginning to be felt. The value of trade among the EAC's members more than doubled between 2005 and 2010, while intra-EAC trade as a share of the bloc's total trade exceeded 10 percent for the first time. Improved integration may be a factor in explaining the buoyant growth outlook for the region. The International Monetary Fund is forecasting real GDP growth of 6.1 percent across the region this year and 6.6 percent in 2014.

External trading partners are watching the EAC's regional integration project with interest. U.S. firms might question the value of doing business in tiny Burundi, but as a member of a trading bloc with more than 135 million people and a combined GDP of \$84 billion, its investment potential suddenly looks a lot more attractive. President Barack Obama has signed a U.S.-EAC Trade and Investment Partnership, which lays the groundwork for a regional investment treaty that will establish safeguards for U.S. investors and catalyze efforts to build trade capacity.

There is still a long way to go. The EAC leadership's lofty rhetoric often runs far ahead of improvements on the ground. Progress has been slow in establishing one-stop border posts, harmonizing customs procedures and cutting tariffs. Delays at ports of entry due to inefficiencies, low capacity and red tape mean that the average time needed to import products into the EAC is 33



days, compared with five days for the United States. This places East African traders at a huge disadvantage relative to their international competitors. The U.S. Trade Commission found that a container of textiles cost \$2,500 to export from the EAC, compared with \$580 from Vietnam. Corruption remains a serious problem and a big factor in scaring off potential investors, both at home and abroad. Despite the EAC's moves to harmonize travel documents, it remains difficult for Africans of one EAC member state to work in another because of restrictive labor laws.

While the politicians continue the slow task of constructing the institutional architecture of the EAC, the private sector is giving real meaning to regional integration. African firms are in the forefront, with banks like Kenya Commercial Bank, supermarkets like Nakumatt and telecoms companies like Simba Telecom taking the lead in establishing regional profiles. U.S. corporate giants are following suit. From its regional headquarters in Nairobi, General Electric is upgrading locomotives and signaling capabilities for Rift Valley Railways as it modernizes the line from Mombasa to Kampala. IBM's Nairobi-based research laboratory is selecting scientists from across the region for skills training and development.

Furthermore, a number of projects are in the works that take a regional approach to East Africa's chronic infrastructure deficit. Energy and transport are the two critical areas. One of the most ambitious projects is Kenya's Lamu Port and Lamu Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor. The scheme, called LAPSSSET, would open up the neglected north of Kenya with new roads, rail links, a port expansion and an oil pipeline, linking its economy more closely with South Sudan and Ethiopia, two prospective future members of the EAC. Recent oil and gas discoveries in Kenya and Tanzania offer opportunities for regional power pooling and distribution projects. The threatened closure of East Africa's only oil refinery, in Mombasa, adds urgency to the search for regional solutions to the EAC's energy needs. Uganda plans to build a refinery to meet its domestic demand, with the addition of an export pipeline at a later date, but the project is still in the discussion stage.

The EAC has come a long way in little over a decade. While it is true that momentum has often stalled in the political process and institutional reforms have not always led to progress on the ground, it is important to manage expectations. The experience of another, much older trading bloc—the European Union—shows that regional integration is a difficult, sometimes tortuous process racked by conflicting political agendas, debates over national sovereignty and crushing bureaucracy. While it seems virtually impossible that the EAC's agenda of political union by 2015 will be achieved on time, missed deadlines are unlikely to disturb the region's continued economic progress and steady passage toward closer trading relations. □

# THE EAC: REGIONAL ENGINE, AFRICAN MODEL

BY PEARL THANDRAYAN  
20 FEB 2013

The East African Community (EAC) provides a useful lens through which to examine the prospects for broader regional integration in East Africa. The current EAC is built on a long history of regional cooperation, including a High Commission (1948-1961), a Common Services Organization (1961-1967) and even a previous attempt at an EAC, which was formed in 1967 and managed to build shared institutions before collapsing in 1977 under the weight of trade imbalances and ideological differences. In spite of the collapse, the three founding countries -- Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania -- agreed to explore and identify areas for future cooperation, and an East African Cooperation Commission was established in the early 1990s to coordinate efforts toward renewed regional cooperation.

The EAC subsequently re-emerged as a regional economic community in 1999, and quickly adopted an ambitious regional integration agenda, leapfrogging the traditional starting point of a free trade agreement to move straight to a customs union. Rwanda and Burundi joined Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania in 2007, and South Sudan and Somalia have applied to join.

Since being reconstituted, the EAC has largely remained true to its goal of a political federation of East Africa, steadily [rolling out a series of regional mechanisms](#) that have included: the establishment of the East African Community Customs Union, followed by a Common Market, a nontariff barrier monitoring and removal mechanism, currency convertibility, joint infrastructure projects, harmonization of standards for goods, harmonized national budget preparations, mutual recognition of health certificates, adoption of an East African passport, temporary travel documents for intraregional travel by EAC citizens, harmonized immigration procedures, joint military exercises and shared criminal intelligence. The EAC's members have also established regional institutions such as the East African Court of Justice, the East African Legislative Assembly, the Science and Technology Commission, the Health Research Commission, the Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency and a Chief Justices Forum.

The EAC's dynamism has helped to propel efforts toward the most ambitious African trade project yet: the so-called Tripartite Free Trade Area, which has been proposed to encompass the existing regional economic blocs of the South African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the EAC. Momentum in this direction seems to have finally brought the goal of a continental economic initiative within reach or at least within sight. The African Union declared in 2012 that an African free trade agreement would be launched in 2017.

But the region's policymakers must first resolve several challenges. Foremost among them is the overlapping membership of regional integration arrangements in southern and eastern Africa, which is almost without parallel. Seven regional economic communities (RECs) with various levels of harmonization are effectively operating within the region, creating a tangled network of integration arrangements with the EAC at the center.

For example, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are not only EAC members but also part of COMESA, while Tanzania is a member of both the EAC and SADC. Kenya and Uganda are additionally members of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development, and Rwanda and Burundi are part of the Economic Community of Central African States. Furthermore, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are members the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries, which was revived in 2004. The most significant and challenging overlaps, however, are with COMESA and the SADC.

Meanwhile, a separate alphabet soup of trade agreements threatens to undermine progress on rationalizing the organizational boundaries of the RECs in eastern and southern Africa. In particular, the member states of SADC, COMESA and the EAC are all negotiating comprehensive trade agreements with the European Union, one of the region's biggest trading partners. These economic partnership agreements (EPAs) create multiple groupings within the SADC and COMESA, largely caused by the existing REC overlaps. Only the economic partnership agreement between the EU and the EAC aligns with an existing REC.

The region is therefore at the center of two broad, complex trade policy agendas with reciprocal impacts on each other: deeper African regional integration and African-European trade relations.

### THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY

The EAC grouping is unique for its stated objective of forging a political federation. Its integration plan envisioned the establishment of a customs union, followed by a common market, then a monetary union and finally a political federation.

The first two phases have already been realized, with the customs union launched in 2005 and the common market in 2010. Yet though the customs union was supposed to be fully operational by January 2010, in reality there remain significant obstacles to the free circulation of goods within it due to the lack of a regional mechanism for the collection, accounting and sharing of customs revenue. A study aimed at identifying a suitable mechanism is ongoing. Implementation of the common market is also lagging, due to delays in harmonization of national laws, standardization of reporting frameworks and finalization of the schedules on free movement of workers and services to conform to the EAC Common Market Protocol. Citizen concerns regarding differences in land tenure systems of partner states are also undermining grass-roots support for implementation.

Monetary union negotiations commenced in 2010 and are also ongoing, with outstanding matters including macroeconomic as well as legal and institutional frameworks. The original goal of establishing a common currency by 2012 was not met, and there remains a long list of issues to be resolved. It is envisaged that a Central Bank and Federal Treasury will be established to support this.

Although the original EAC target date of 2013 for the formation of a political federation will not be met, member states have already made progress on building the common political foundation necessary to support such a federation. Interim steps already taken include cooperation on such issues as conflict prevention, management and resolution; refugee management; and combating the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons. Formal institutional advances include the establishment of an EAC Forum of Electoral Commissions, a Forum of National Human Rights Commissions, Anti-Corruption/Ombudsman agencies and a Forum of Chief Justices. Meanwhile, in addition to a peace and security protocol signed in early 2013, EAC member states are also due to conclude protocols on combating and preventing corruption, promoting good governance and advancing defense cooperation. Nevertheless, more progress will be necessary if the political federation is to be realized on a fast-tracked basis as proposed.

Economically, intra-EAC trade has grown since the launch of the customs union in 2005, from roughly \$1.6 billion in 2006 to roughly \$3.8 billion in 2010. Meanwhile, the share of intra-EAC trade in total trade rose from 7.8 percent in 2006 to around 11.4 percent in 2010, according to of-

ficial EAC figures, with the share of intra-EAC exports to total exports rising from 14 percent in 2006 to around 20.2 percent in 2010. Intraregional investment flows have similarly risen. Kenyan firms in particular are adopting regional strategies, with Kenyan investment now ranking No. 2 in Tanzania and among the top five in Uganda. Key areas of Kenyan investment have included distribution, insurance and banking.

Nonetheless, trade among EAC countries is dominated by primary products. Burundi's key exports include gold, tea and mate, sugar, coffee and hides and skin. Rwanda's are tea, coffee, ores and concentrates, hides and skins and petroleum products. Tanzania's main exports to EAC member states are fish, tea, cotton, halogen salt, maize and textile products. Uganda's key export commodities are vegetables, steel, maize and tobacco, imported by all the countries in the EAC.

Kenya is the most diversified exporter in terms of value-added products, with its main exports to EAC partner states being petroleum products, apparel, construction materials such as lime and cement, steel and soaps, cleansers and polishes.

Clearly the EAC region needs to focus on value addition to complement its primary products. The share of industrial products in the region's GDP grew only slightly from 2006 to 2010.

To further facilitate intraregional trade, joint infrastructure investments [have been identified](#), and transport and communications policies are being harmonized, though there are significant obstacles to overcome. Transport, water, energy and information and communications technology are all areas where the region needs to improve. Logistics performance indicators for eastern Africa, measuring quality of infrastructure and competence, for example, are lower on average than those for all other regions in sub-Saharan Africa, due to cumbersome customs procedures, dilapidated infrastructure and poor logistics competence. Energy generation capacities have also not kept pace with the energy needs of the region. The outlook for communications is better, however, with Internet and mobile phone penetration growing rapidly and a protocol on information, communication and technology networks approved in late-2012.

The EAC's development strategies, too, have been hampered by a range of challenges. These include budgetary constraints, mismatches between regional and partner state development planning and inadequate national-level capacities to domesticate regional policies. Further challenges include supply-side constraints, weak legal, regulatory and dispute-settlement mechanisms and related problems in enforcement of community obligations and decisions. Linked to this shortcoming is weak institutional infrastructure and inadequate enforcement machinery and sanction mechanisms, and lengthy decision-making systems and processes. Crucial private sector constraints include limited supply capacities to take advantage of the regional market and an underdeveloped regional infrastructure. Public sector challenges include a lack of timely and reliable regional statistics coupled with a weak information-sharing culture among partner states.

Overall, the EAC has made solid progress toward economic integration, though many challenges remain as it seeks to move toward a full political federation. Even so, it could serve as a template for deeper integration across the broader region.

## THE TRIPARTITE FTA

In early February 2008, the EAC Secretariat [called for the creation of a free trade area](#) encompassing the EAC, COMESA and SADC in order to resolve regional trade bloc differences and deal with conflicts related to external trading arrangements with trade partners. Leaders of the three blocs officially launched the Tripartite FTA (TFTA) at a summit later in 2008. According to the African Union, the three regional economic blocs constitute 58 percent of the continent's GDP, 57 percent of its population and more than half of the AU membership.

Twenty-two of the 26 Tripartite states are already covered by the FTAs of COMESA, the EAC and

the SADC, with the four additional members being Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The extent of the coverage by the three pre-existing FTAs is an important factor, as it lays the basis for consolidating them into the new Tripartite FTA. In theory, this should allow for the usually painstaking process of trade negotiations to be considerably shortened, in that further negotiations will only be necessary between member states that do not currently have any preferential arrangement.

Four key areas of cooperation were called for: harmonization of trade regimes; free movement of businesspersons; joint implementation of regional infrastructure projects and programs; and legal and institutional arrangements for regional cooperation.

The summit's participants agreed on the establishment of an FTA with the ultimate goal of establishing a customs union involving all Tripartite member states. Although the negotiations are already running about six months behind schedule, the three secretariats hope to conclude the talks by early 2014. South Africa has placed an emphasis on practical integration, through infrastructure development and trade facilitation.

As noted, however, countries in eastern and southern Africa formed regional groupings for the purpose of negotiating EPAs with the EU, which only overlap with already-existing RECs in the case of the EAC. These comprise an Eastern and Southern Africa EPA configuration; a Southern African Development Community EPA configuration; and finally, an EAC configuration. To safeguard the integrity of the EAC grouping, Tanzania left the SADC EPA to join its EAC partner states in their own EPA.

The pre-existing overlap of REC memberships already generates conflicting implementation agendas; because the integration obligations differ from one REC to the next, multiple memberships often lead to a country having to implement conflicting obligations. Further conflicts in jurisdiction are created where similar institutional mandates exist, while legal uncertainty is also created in cases where more than one trade arrangement and attendant obligations apply to trade between two countries. Such uncertainties undermine the aim of establishing rules-based dispensations and add considerably to transaction costs and duplication. This increases the burden on member states, which often [already lack the necessary capacity and resources](#). These problems are exacerbated by the added layer of misaligned EPAs.

Harmonization of EPA positions among the regional groupings would require them, first, to agree on the same common external tariffs toward the EU; second, to align liberalization schedules wherever possible; and, third, to align exclusion baskets. This is unlikely to occur, not least because it would require reopening negotiations with the EU, which could trigger additional EU requests and years of further negotiation. The EPA negotiations are already overdue for conclusion, having started in 2007.

The drive toward a unified SADC, COMESA and EAC FTA -- and a possible customs union -- becomes more understandable in this context. The only alternative would be to try and rationalize both the EPAs and the RECs, and for many TFTA states, the eventual launch of a SADC customs union would force them to choose between different RECs, a decision many have been successfully avoiding for decades. A TFTA complemented by a customs union offers a convenient way to bypass the RECs component of this tangle, although the route to a final TFTA is likely to take some time, given the number of players.

## TOWARD DEEPER REGIONAL INTEGRATION

For the EAC, the most pressing overlap to resolve is that of Tanzania's continued membership in SADC. It was only after a protracted struggle that Tanzania joined the EAC EPA, and efforts to convince Tanzania to surrender its SADC membership have been unsuccessful. It is possible that the TFTA, if successfully implemented, will finally present an alternative solution.

While there are technical reasons for Tanzania's position, its continued membership in the SADC highlights the fact that economic arguments are not the only factor determining membership in regional trade blocs. Parallel memberships are maintained because a single bloc does not satisfy all the strategic, political and economic needs and objectives of the member state. Traditionally, Tanzania and Kenya have been distrustful of each other's economic and sometimes political intentions. An SADC membership has seemingly allowed Tanzania to counter Kenya's historical regional economic dominance through a closer political and economic relationship with South Africa, with which Tanzania has strong historical ties. That the EAC has made such progress in the face of this disunity may be attributed in part to the efforts of Uganda and its president, Yoweri Museveni, who has consistently supported and championed the cause of a Federation of East Africa.

A potentially similar rivalry lurks in the TFTA among South Africa, Kenya and Egypt. This proposed FTA marks the first time that these three large African economies will be joined within the same regional integration arrangement. The process will have to be very carefully managed, politically and economically, to avoid unnecessary antagonism and shallow integration.

In this context, the EAC offers some pointers as to the useful ingredients or variables that appear to facilitate and deepen regional integration. The extent to which these variables are unique to the EAC is key to whether the same "fast-tracked" comprehensive integration [could be attempted in other regions](#).

The first variable would appear to be a dominant ruling party and a divided or weakened opposition, combined with a weak civil society, within the countries of the proposed FTA. These kinds of power relations lend themselves to fast-tracking of regional integration by the political elite. For the integration to be sustainable and stable, however, the opposition and civil society must be included in the process.

The second necessary variable would be acceptance by the political elite of some reduction of sovereignty. Without this, integration will founder. Moreover, it is vital that the political and economic benefits of integration occur fast enough to offset any loss of sovereignty.

The third apparent variable is that the REC's strongest or dominant business sector must be solidly behind the integration initiative. In the same vein, the presence of a reasonably dominant economy appears to provide both a driver for integration and potential market access opportunities that would attract the support of smaller economies in the REC. Ideally, however, the level of dominance must not be overwhelming.

The fourth variable is history, meaning a common regional past that binds the parties together in some way. The fifth is the need for a determined champion, which the EAC has in Museveni. The sixth is that of visible delivery. There must be rapid and tangible benefits that can be ascribed to the integration in order to boost and sustain popular support for the project. The creation of an effective technocratic web of integration that includes harmonization and policy coordination forms the seventh variable. An eighth would seem to be linguistic and cultural commonality to some degree. Finally, a possible ninth variable would be an understanding that a pooled economic zone is necessary in the face of some external threat, whether it be a trade partner or a process, such as globalization or marginalization.

If the EAC were to be successful in negotiating a political federation within a Tripartite Customs Union, it could provide a working model for the political and economic future that pan-Africanists have long dreamed of. It remains an ambitious project, as the goal of a regional political federation has never been successfully implemented in Africa, and seldom outside the continent in the modern era.

Although large challenges remain, it is evident that the political will and technical machinery are in place to propel the EAC forward as a driver of this process. Although the target of 2013 may

drift to perhaps 2018, it is very likely that the EAC will remain committed to its integration agenda and goal of political federation. Although the EAC has a unique history of integration to build on, it is still as reliant as other African RECs on sound decision-making, technical capacity and political will. In this respect it provides an encouraging example of what can be accomplished. From the day it achieves political federation status, a new chapter will have begun in African history. □

# UGANDA'S MUSEVENI MOVES TO CONSOLIDATE GRIP OVER A TENSE COUNTRY

BY GAAKI KIGAMBO  
20 JUN 2013

A recent reshuffle of Uganda's military command by longtime President Yoweri Museveni installed into the leadership a new generation of younger, more loyal officers effectively headed by Museveni's son, Brig. Muhoozi Kainerugaba. The move is seen as aimed to strengthen Museveni's grip on an army that has recently appeared to lack discipline due to growing displeasure within its senior ranks. But it also left the president as the sole remaining high-ranking member of the group that captured power a quarter-century ago. Museveni now rules, without any obvious challenger, a very tense country.

The mainstream opposition, including the Forum for Democratic Change, which made strong showings in Uganda's last two elections, remains divided. Its incoherence, in terms of both strategy and ideology, and its woeful financial situation make it nearly impossible for the party to mount any serious challenge to Museveni. With vast amounts of money at his disposal during the most recent election, in 2011, Museveni secured yet another term. The next presidential election is scheduled for 2016, at which point he will have been in office for 30 years.

While the army reshuffle had long been expected, it was hastened by allegations made in early May by Gen. David Sejusa, then the country's coordinator of intelligence services, that senior government officials opposed to Museveni's alleged plan to have his son succeed him in power risked being assassinated. Sejusa has since left the country and taken up residence in the U.K.

The allegations led to a 10-day shutdown of the newspaper that first published them—the Daily Monitor, Uganda's largest and often critical privately owned newspaper—along with the daily's two radio subsidiaries. The government also closed Red Pepper, an acerbic tabloid, and its four print subsidiaries, all of which had reported extensively on Sejusa's fallout with Museveni.

This kind of media clampdown, which the government has resorted to a number of times when it has felt exposed, is a clear reminder of how far Museveni is willing to go to constrict not just media freedom, but free expression in general, analysts have concluded.

The military reshuffle, the media siege and the presentation of Uganda's budgetary plans for fiscal year 2013-2014 might have served to divert attention from Sejusa's allegations. But safely ensconced in London, Sejusa [has continued to accuse Museveni](#) of trying to engineer an undemocratic succession.

Museveni's installation of the next-generation military command has helped keep those concerns alive. The Ugandan military's old guard, two members of which—Gen. Aronda Nyakairima and Lt. Gen. Ivan Koreta—headed the army until the May reshuffle, tended to conduct themselves with a sense of entitlement over the country's politico-military affairs because of their participation in the 1981-1985 war that propelled Museveni to power.



As a result, Museveni had to mix accommodation and compromise to deal effectively with his guerrilla war comrades, something he might not have to do with the new leaders of the army, who owe their influential positions less to their own accomplishments than to the magnanimity of their commander-in-chief.

This magnanimity is most clearly illustrated by his son's rapid rise. In the army since 1999, Kainerugaba was commissioned a second lieutenant in 2000, became a major in 2003, a lieutenant colonel in 2008 and was promoted to his current rank in 2012.

He has not only sprinted through the ranks, he also commands the country's special forces, an elite unit in the military that guards Museveni himself, as well as Uganda's key installations, [including oil fields](#).

A loyal army is an important factor in Museveni's grip on power, especially as he confronts growing discontent within his ruling party stemming from the length of his tenure in office. As one example, at a recent party retreat, a party representative in parliament asked Museveni to retire because he had stayed too long in power.

Such a demand was hitherto unthinkable because of the admiration Museveni commanded from having ended decades of instability and economic stagnation and setting Uganda on a path of robust recovery and growth that it has sustained for more than a decade.

Museveni responded to the MP's request by kicking him out of the party along with three like-minded colleagues. Museveni has also commenced legal proceedings to expel the dissenters from an increasingly assertive parliament that has tended to present itself as a counterweight to the executive's overriding powers.

Museveni also has to deal with [an ever-more disgruntled public](#) that feels disillusioned about his government's performance in delivering social services, in spite of a relatively strong economy. It is not uncommon for public protests to break out over bad roads, electricity outages or shortages of medicine.

This dismal record has been mainly attributed to a progressive deterioration in governance and Museveni's failure to rein in the country's runaway corruption, all of which has led to cuts in the foreign aid his government depends on to fund its operations.

Museveni's toughest challenge should he seek re-election in 2016, as indeed he seems likely to do, is expected to come from within his own party. Already, a former deputy, Gilbert Bukenya, has announced he will contest the election. Should Museveni win, it would certainly amplify the existing tensions within his party, even potentially splitting it apart—that is, assuming the party does not come apart before the elections.

What is more, a Museveni victory would amplify the incongruity of his continued rule in an increasingly democratic region. Kenya, Uganda's major trading partner, recently elected a new president, and Tanzania is expected to have a new leader after the elections in 2015.

Political protests that broke out immediately after the 2011 polls and social tensions owing to runaway inflation and the rise in the cost of living for much of the past two years unveiled the risks of instability the country faces and exposed the inherent danger of Museveni's continued hold on power. Barring an early, smooth and legitimate transition, it is difficult to imagine a peaceful post-Museveni Uganda. □

# GENERATIONAL SHIFT MAY SHAKE UP ETHIOPIAN POLITICS AFTER MELES ZENAWI

BY TERRENCE LYONS

25 APR 2013

The death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in August 2012 marked the end of an era in contemporary Ethiopian politics. After defeating the brutal Derg regime in 1991, Meles headed the powerful ruling party that led the country of more than 80 million through a massive transformation. But it is a mistake to think of his tenure as a period of one-man rule or his death as creating either a political vacuum or an opportunity for liberal reform, as power, authority and resources never rested in Meles' hands alone.

Meles' Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) created an Ethiopia based around ethnically defined regions and political parties, state control over land and other key economic assets and a strong authoritarian political party. Meles' aim was to create a developmental state through revolutionary democracy, a project that more closely resembled the Chinese model than Western notions of liberalism. Levels of economic growth have been high and the expansion of health care impressive. At the same time, however, Ethiopia has effectively criminalized dissent and made it virtually impossible for civil society organizations to engage in human rights monitoring or democratization initiatives.

Many [reflections on Meles' leadership](#) have pointed to his personal qualities and his complicated and often quite contentious legacies. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice gave a laudatory speech at his funeral, calling him "an uncommon leader, a rare visionary and a true friend to me and many." But Meles left behind a larger set of interlinked interests that include key figures in each of the ethnic parties that make up the EPRDF coalition; powerful economic institutions and mass organizations controlled by leading members of the ruling party; and, most importantly, the large and disciplined military and security services. This old order remains fundamentally in place even after Meles' passing. While formal authority has shifted to Hailemariam Dessalegn, a former deputy prime minister who has now ascended to the top post, it is clear that power remains embedded within this network of party, economic and military institutions, at least for now.

The EPRDF is the quintessential authoritarian party. In 2010 the ruling coalition and its allies won 99.6 percent of the seats in the national parliament, and by 2012 an estimated 6 million people had joined the party. Many sign up to gain access to government goods or to have a realistic chance of obtaining a position in the civil service. From the most remote village to the center of power, the EPRDF controls all political and economic space, with few distinctions between party and government. Meles' death did not provide opportunities for the shattered, repressed and increasingly ineffectual opposition to engage in politics effectively. There are no public signs of a dissident network within the military or ruling party, and it is nearly impossible to mobilize outside of those institutions.

Still, while the networks of power have proved robust, the EPRDF has undergone a remarkable transition of party leaders in recent years. A number of senior figures stepped down from the co-

alition's executive committee in 2010, notably Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin and Trade Minister Girma Biru, who were sent to embassies some distance from the political action. The EPRDF Congress last month saw the rise of a younger generation that did not participate in the armed struggle but rather had moved up party ranks on the basis of technocratic capabilities and loyalty.

The EPRDF remains, however, a coalition of ethnically based parties that differ sharply in terms of size, experience in the liberation struggle and ability to administer their respective regions. The inherent tension between centralized power and ethnic- and region-based parties remains strong. If a cabinet member from the ethnic Amhara party, for example, is replaced by someone from the ethnic Oromo party, it is perceived as a shift in the relative power of the two ethnic groups, even if the EPRDF as a whole remains in charge. This underlying ethnic positioning was evident when Hailemariam, from the southern wing of the party, appointed representatives of the Tigray, Amhara and Oromo wings as deputy prime ministers so that each constituent party retained a seat at the table.

Such tensions could be exacerbated by economic factors. Ethiopia experienced double-digit growth between 2004 and 2008, and the building boom in Addis Ababa and the construction of roads and regional universities is impressive. Hailemariam remains committed to Meles' ambitious Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) for 2010-2015, which projected GDP growth of 10-15 percent and massive public sector investment in infrastructure, mining and energy. The Millennium Dam on the Blue Nile is the symbolic centerpiece of the plan and will be the largest hydroelectric power plant in sub-Saharan Africa when completed. It is not clear, however, whether Ethiopia will be able to finance all of its proposals. Actual economic growth is forecast to be closer to 7 percent from 2013-2017 -- quite good, but not enough to meet the GTP's targets. Ethiopia's stability depends upon a rapidly growing economy, and a decline will create enormous political pressures.

Many strong, authoritarian parties shatter when succession crises create intraparty conflicts. While the EPRDF regime has held together despite the death of its longtime leader, it will be an extraordinary accomplishment if the EPRDF can manage the larger generational transition in which the distribution of power among different ethnic-based factions is in flux and many ambitious actors now see a once-in-a-lifetime chance to make it to the top. The period leading up to the 2015 elections will test Hailemariam's political skills. If one or another faction perceives that it has a better chance of gaining or retaining power by making an alternative coalition and challenging the old guard, then the EPRDF may prove brittle and shatter. Such a scenario, while by no means inevitable, has the potential to become violent and to have significant spillover effects throughout the war-torn Horn of Africa. □

# THE NEXT PHASE OF U.N. ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA

BY MEGAN GLEASON-ROBERTS, ALISCHA KUGEL  
20 MAY 2013

June will be the start of a new phase of United Nations engagement in Somalia, when the new U.N. Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) will replace the long-standing U.N. Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS), in place since 1995. In late-April, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon tapped Nicholas Kay, a former British ambassador and Africa director at the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as the secretary-general's new special representative in Somalia. When Kay takes up his duties as the head of UNSOM on June 3, he will be presented with both risks and opportunities at a crucial time of renewed hope and momentum for Somalia.

Somalia, with the help of the international community, has achieved important political and security milestones over the past year. Bolstered by additional resources, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), alongside Somali security forces, regional countries and allied groups, [has made crucial security advances](#) against the Islamist group al-Shabab. These gains have been matched with political achievements including the adoption of a provisional constitution and the election of a new federal parliament and president, thereby [concluding the fraught eight-year transitional period](#). Concerted engagement to tackle piracy in the Horn of Africa [has contributed to a decline in piracy attacks](#) off the Somali coast.

Major risks still exist, both for international actors, [as evidenced by the recent deadly attack](#) on a convoy of Qatari officials, and the new government. Only two days after his election in September 2012, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud [escaped an assassination attempt](#). More recently, militants targeted judicial officials, including in [an April 15 attack on the Mogadishu courthouse](#) that killed more than 35 people and the assassination of the deputy state attorney later the same month. The African Union (AU) has also paid a heavy price for the advances over the past year, with the total AMISOM death toll [recently reaching 3,000 troops](#). These attacks show that while security in Mogadishu overall has improved, al-Shabab still poses a significant risk, through asymmetrical attacks in the capital and its continued presence in the country's south.

With UNSOM, which will be headquartered in Mogadishu and deployed across Somalia, the U.N. drastically increases its visibility in Somalia. (UNPOS operated out of Nairobi for 17 years [before relocating a limited number of staff](#) to Mogadishu in January 2012.) While this will undoubtedly increase the mission's ability to perform its good office functions, it also puts mission staff at considerable risk. The volatile operating environment could restrict staffers' mobility, which in turn can negatively impact the mission's role as a key interlocutor at a time when expectations from Somali society, the government and the international community on UNSOM are high.

The U.N. will rely on AMISOM troops, including a 300-strong force for the protection of U.N. and international community staffers, to create secure conditions for the government's peace and reconciliation process and stabilization efforts across Somalia. Furthermore, UNSOM is mandated to "work in a coordinated manner with AMISOM." This closer alignment of the two actors may

prove challenging, as in the past there have been considerable differences between the U.N. and AMISOM over the political implications of military actions.

There have also been sensitivities regarding the role of the AU and U.N. civilian components in assisting the government to extend state authority beyond Mogadishu. The AU has requested and received Security Council authorization for an enhanced civilian component for AMISOM to support the government's stabilization and reconciliation efforts. Some U.N. officials, however, are skeptical of the AU's eagerness to develop its multidimensional civilian capacities, particularly in areas where the U.N. sees itself as having established expertise and a comparative advantage. The trust deficit reflects larger issues about strategic vision and partnership between the organizations. It remains to be seen how the dynamic plays out in Somalia, where UNSOM is mandated to provide strategic policy advice to the government and AMISOM on peacebuilding and statebuilding tasks, including on security sector reform. The U.N.'s larger and more visible role in Somalia also runs the risk of antagonizing other regional actors, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which may see their involvement restricted, thereby contributing to turf wars between the organizations.

UNSOM's human rights monitoring mandate may further add to the tension in the relationship between the AU and the U.N. on the ground. Although the AU has taken measures to minimize civilian harm during its operations, including developing an indirect fire policy aimed at better controlling the use of mortars and artillery, civilians are often caught in the crossfire, and human rights groups have criticized AMISOM over civilian casualties. Currently, AMISOM [is probing the death of several civilians](#), including children that were allegedly shot by its troops in January in a village west of Mogadishu.

In addition, despite a slight improvement in early 2013, the humanitarian situation in Somalia remains dire. As of January, [3.8 million Somalis required humanitarian assistance](#) (.pdf). An estimated 1.1 million are internally displaced and a million more are living as refugees in neighboring countries. As an integrated mission, UNSOM will combine the roles of the U.N. humanitarian and resident coordinator under one roof and will coordinate the activities of the U.N. Country Team, a move that humanitarian groups have resisted for years. The current head of UNPOS, Augustine Mahiga, has done much to improve the relationship between the humanitarian community and U.N. staffers in Somalia that was strained under his predecessor, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. Nonetheless, integration remains a contentious issue. Humanitarian actors raised concerns that merging humanitarian operations with the U.N.'s political work would jeopardize the principle of impartiality. UNSOM will have to show that it can preserve the humanitarian space, while helping to advance state authority and services across Somalia.

Donor countries [pledged more than \\$350 million](#) at an international donor conference in London on May 7 to bolster the Somali government, particularly its security, justice and financial institutions. Ahead of the meeting, the U.N. [announced plans to shift its focus](#) from humanitarian aid toward development work. Both actions signal faith in the government's ability to consolidate gains and govern effectively. They also illustrate the careful line the U.N. mission will walk in Somalia, tasked with coordinating the growing and increasingly active donor community, while also creating space for the new government to drive policy, including through its work on [the New Deal for International Engagement in Fragile States](#).

Kay will take office in two weeks. [His experience in the region](#), having served as U.K. ambassador in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, as well as his experience in fast-moving and insecure environments, including in Afghanistan, will serve him well in his new position. He also has considerable international backing: The Security Council is united in its support of the new mission, and Somalia [is a key focus for the G-8](#) this year under the U.K.'s presidency. But as the U.N. enters a new phase of engagement in Somalia, Kay will have a limited window to take on these new challenges and capitalize on the security and political achievements over the past year to support Somalia in achieving durable peace. □

# DJIBOUTI'S GUELLEH ATTEMPTS A MANAGED OPENING

BY CATHERINE CHENEY  
26 FEB 2013

In Djibouti, the small but strategically important state in the Horn of Africa, security forces are still working to disperse opposition supporters protesting the ruling coalition's victory in Friday's parliamentary elections. The vote marked the end of the opposition parties' 10-year boycott on contesting elections.

Djibouti is home to the only permanent U.S. military base in Africa, and instability there [may have important implications](#) for the wider region, including Yemen and Somalia.

On Friday, authoritarian President Ismail Omar Guelleh and his Union for the Presidential Majority [claimed to have won](#) 49 out of 65 seats in the National Assembly in an election the opposition has rejected as flawed.

[James Schneider](#), editor-in-chief of Think Africa Press, told Trend Lines in an email interview that the election was significant for two reasons.

"Firstly, the opposition has forced their way into parliament, and Guelleh has facilitated this," he said, explaining that this is the first time since Djibouti's independence in 1977 that members of the political opposition have been represented in parliament.

Second, the level of support for the opposition, at least as measured in numbers of votes cast for the opposition and attendees at opposition rallies, if not in actual parliamentary seats, "demonstrates a society which is increasingly standing up for itself and challenging power," he continued.

The opposition parties ended their election boycott this year after Guelleh agreed that one-fifth of parliamentary seats [would be allotted by proportional representation](#).

"By changing the electoral law to include a proportional representation component, he guaranteed opposition involvement in the election, preventing another boycott, which would have caused embarrassment with partners and perhaps unrest at home," Schneider said.

While Guelleh still broadly controls the system, he is acknowledging, or being forced to recognize, just how much opposition there is to his rule. "Djibouti is opening up a bit and Guelleh is trying to manage it," said Schneider. Still, the presence of several opposition members in parliament will not have a huge impact on its own.

"At this stage, it isn't clear whether the election results were better for the opposition or for Guelleh," said Schneider, explaining that while winning parliamentary seats might seem like a victory for the opposition, the result also serves Guelleh by providing the outward sign of multiparty electoral competition.

Meanwhile, Djibouti has a strong presidential system, and Guelleh will continue to wield executive power as well as some legislative power, Schneider explained. His party still maintains a strong majority in parliament, which is not particularly powerful, according to Schneider.

“It remains to be seen whether some of the opposition will be institutionalized into a system that Guelleh controls,” he continued. “This appears to be his plan. He can make small changes and incorporate new figures into his patronage network, keep the outward signs of electoral legitimacy and keep almost total power.”

“Djibouti has many drivers for protest, calls for and attempts at change, which suggest that it and the violent reactions from the state it engenders will continue,” Schneider said.

But Schneider added that between the president’s policing capacity and his “ability to dole out patronage,” Guelleh is likely to “keep a lid on things.”

He added that Djibouti’s disproportionately young population will be an important factor in the country’s future.

“It is difficult to see how this population can continue to be controlled with such stark problems facing the country,” said Schneider, who [wrote about Djiboutians’ woes](#) for Think Africa Press prior to the elections.

“This really goes back to the significance question,” he said. “This election marks the beginning of Guelleh, the various sectors of Djiboutian society, the organized opposition and international partners engaging in an awkward dance to square this circle -- what are the young to do?” □

# WITH ELECTIONS LOOMING, ZIMBABWE NOT YET OPEN FOR BUSINESS

BY RICHARD DOWNIE  
27 JUN 2013

As the people of Zimbabwe steel themselves for another election cycle and their leaders argue over the timing of the poll, international investors are watching political developments with interest. Excitement about the economic opportunities in Zimbabwe, combined with frustration at the lack of good policy options to hasten the departure of President Robert Mugabe, has fueled a growing desire to explore alternatives to the political stalemate.

The European Union has already shown its willingness to open a new chapter in its relations with Zimbabwe. In March, Brussels suspended sanctions against 81 officials and eight companies linked to Mugabe's ZANU-PF party. It said the move was in response to the successful [passage of Zimbabwe's new constitution](#). While the United States has yet to follow suit, Washington has been quietly exploring opportunities to re-engage with Zimbabwe following a long period of diplomatic inaction. In April, the former U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Andrew Young, delivered a letter from Secretary of State John Kerry outlining a path to normalized relations, tied to political reforms. In the meantime, U.S. trade with Zimbabwe has been continuing at modest levels in spite of the unrelenting political deadlock, reaching \$106 million in 2012.

A look at Zimbabwe's economic picture shows a modest improvement since the Global Political Agreement ended the 2008 election crisis and ushered in a fractious power-sharing government between Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai. Zimbabwe's economy has recovered ground, albeit from the historic low point of 2008, when real GDP growth stood at minus 18 percent. Growth hovered at just under 10 percent a year from 2009 to 2011 but has since tapered off. Nonetheless, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts robust real GDP growth of 5 percent this year and 5.7 percent in 2014.

The international community has acknowledged the improved stewardship of Zimbabwe's economy under ministers belonging to Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change party. This month, the IMF agreed to monitor a program of economic reforms initiated by Zimbabwe aimed at clearing the country's arrears of \$125 million to the fund. This is the first tentative step in the long process of tackling Zimbabwe's formidable external debt burden of approximately \$10.7 billion, most of which is in the form of arrears. Only when this debt is cleared will the country become eligible for new external borrowing.

Some of the more risk-tolerant U.S. investors are eyeing opportunities in Zimbabwe and waiting in the wings for the political hurdles to be removed. But is this sense of cautious optimism justified? The short answer is probably not, at least in the near term. Zimbabwe's economic and political fortunes are inseparably linked. With presidential, parliamentary and local elections around the corner and Mugabe showing no sign of relinquishing power even if he loses, the next few months promise to be bumpy.



Furthermore, Zimbabwe's economic recovery remains highly vulnerable. Recent improvements are largely due to Zimbabwe's decision to abandon its currency in favor of the U.S. dollar. While this brought an end to hyperinflation, it marks the beginning rather than the end of the economic reform process.

The government continues to lead a hand-to-mouth existence. In January, Finance Minister Tendai Biti said there was only \$217 left in the government coffers at the end of the month, once the country's civil servants had received their paychecks. Part of the problem is that the bulk of the country's diamond revenues are diverted before they can find their way into the treasury, ending up in the pockets of well-connected state security officials. In May 2012, Biti said that projected diamond revenues in the first quarter of the year had been \$122.5 million but that only \$30 million had accrued to the treasury.

This kind of brazen corruption, combined with weak rule of law, is a big disincentive to foreign investment. But perhaps the biggest red flag is Zimbabwe's Indigenization Act, which demands that foreign-owned businesses with investments in Zimbabwe give up a majority stake to local firms. Zimbabwe's politicians are still arguing about how to implement the act. But the looming prospect of state appropriation will scare off all but the most bullish foreign investors. ZANU-PF's track record is hardly reassuring, given its previous seizure of privately owned commercial farms without compensation.

Needless to say, ZANU-PF claims that Zimbabwe's enduring economic hardship is due to the effects of international sanctions rather than its own corruption, mismanagement and abuse of property rights. It has even persuaded Tsvangirai to tour the main Western capitals to make the case on its behalf. But ZANU-PF's argument is disingenuous; U.S. sanctions are mainly targeted at named individuals and companies, not the broader public of Zimbabwe.

Meanwhile, the controversy surrounding the upcoming ballot is a case of politics as usual for Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF is clamoring for elections as soon as possible and has been boosted by the country's Constitutional Court, which ruled that they must be held by July 31. While international mediators from the Southern African Development Community have urged the court to push back the date, any delay will be a matter of a few weeks at most and will not alter the electoral landscape, which virtually guarantees that ZANU-PF will remain in office.

As a result, the likelihood of Zimbabwe holding even semi-credible elections in the coming weeks or months is remote at best. Mugabe and his allies show no desire to make the kind of sweeping electoral and security sector reforms required to ensure a free and fair vote because such an outcome would reduce their chances of remaining in office. Without political change, Zimbabwe's economy will remain in limbo.

Until conditions on the ground significantly improve, there is no reason for the U.S. to loosen its sanctions regime, even if the policy has so far failed to weaken the influence of ZANU-PF hardliners. Zimbabwe may have declared itself open for business, but for the time being, U.S. investors would be wise to think twice before entering the market. □

# ZIMBABWE'S NEW CONSTITUTION UNLIKELY TO PREVENT ELECTION VIOLENCE

BY ALEXANDER NOYES  
19 FEB 2013

After years of political wrangling, Zimbabwe's power-sharing government announced in mid-January an agreement on a new constitution, setting the stage for a constitutional referendum and general elections in the coming months. While progress on the constitution is a welcome step forward for institutional and democratic reforms, President Robert Mugabe's continued grip on the country's coercive apparatus and disregard for formal institutions mean that a new constitution will likely be insufficient to avert another round of electoral violence in Zimbabwe.

The [compromise draft document](#), which [curtails the power of the executive](#), among other changes, enjoys support from all parties in the unity government -- Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the smaller MDC faction currently led by Welshman Ncube.

Given this level of support, the constitutional referendum tentatively scheduled for March 16 is widely expected to pass. Last month, Tsvangirai [confidently stated](#), "Since there is a national consensus by all parties, the referendum will be a formality." Unless Mugabe and ZANU-PF change course and decide to campaign against the constitution, a referendum is likely to be relatively uncontested and peaceful.

Subsequent presidential and legislative elections, however, face a higher risk of political violence. The general elections have much higher stakes than the referendum and will be tightly contested, especially in light of [increased disillusionment among MDC supporters](#). The primary impediment to peaceful general elections in Zimbabwe is the persistent role of security actors and militias in the political process.

After more than 30 years in power, a symbiotic relationship has developed among Mugabe, ZANU-PF and a faction of security sector leaders, the so-called securocrats. In this mutually beneficial arrangement, security chiefs orchestrate campaigns of violence to intimidate and coerce MDC supporters into voting for ZANU-PF and, in return, are rewarded with political power and access to lucrative patronage networks. Mugabe has employed this electoral strategy in successive polls over the past decade to stay in power.

Such centralized political violence, carried out by a mix of security officials, youth militias and self-styled liberation war veterans, reached a fever pitch in the disputed 2008 elections, leaving more than 200 dead and precipitating the Global Political Agreement (GPA) that led to the formation of the current "unity" government in early 2009. Although the GPA included a few toothless references to security sector reform, and several superficial changes to security policies have been enacted since 2009, the power-sharing government [has made little real progress](#) (.pdf) on depoliticizing the security apparatus.

Most worryingly, since 2009 Mugabe has found ways to weaken or circumnavigate new institutions designed to overhaul security governance, such as the National Security Council (NSC), established in 2009, [by continuing to wield decision-making authority](#) through informal parallel channels, such as the Joint Operations Command (JOC). The JOC is Zimbabwe's supreme security organ, which the NSC was meant to replace. Through these informal mechanisms, Mugabe and ZANU-PF remain firmly in command of state-controlled violence.

This failure to rein in the power of the securocrats and demobilize political gangs and militias -- the main protagonists of political violence in Zimbabwe -- substantially increases the threat of violence in upcoming general elections, even if a new constitution is passed. Indeed, recent developments suggest that Mugabe, ZANU-PF and the security chiefs plan to once again use violence to get votes. Soldiers have already [reportedly been deployed to rural](#) areas, including in Manicaland and Masvingo, and political militias aligned with ZANU-PF [remain active](#).

Earlier drafts of the constitution contained measures intended to loosen the president's grip on the state's security architecture, which Mugabe vociferously objected to. While his embrace of the current document suggests that remaining reforms may have been watered down, the present draft does include substantive security reforms, including term limits for security chiefs and the barring of active-duty security officials from holding positions in civilian institutions.

Even if these reforms remain and do become law, as looks likely, it will not be possible to implement institutional security changes in Zimbabwe in time to forestall violence surrounding the general elections. Those reforms should be applauded, but they will in all likelihood have negligible impact until Mugabe fades from the political landscape -- as illustrated by the ineffectual NSC.

Despite this bleak picture, several steps can be taken to help contain the worst election-related violence. The South African Development Community (SADC) mediation team on Zimbabwe, headed by South African President Jacob Zuma, deserves much credit for progress on the constitution-making process and for demanding reforms before elections take place. Mugabe and the generals, however, have repeatedly rebuffed Zuma on the issue of reforming security institutions, and South Africa has replied with mixed messages to ZANU-PF, one day holding a tough position, the next [offering military support](#).

Instead, South Africa should formulate a consistent, comprehensive policy on Zimbabwe and take a hard line on Mugabe and the security chiefs. Zuma could then lead an effort, under the auspices of the SADC and with support from the African Union, to put concerted pressure on Mugabe and the securocrats by threatening concrete economic and political repercussions if violence erupts.

The SADC should also insist that international observers be allowed entry into Zimbabwe with ample time to monitor preparations and the polls. It would also be wise for the international community to keep sanctions in place until after the general elections, even if the constitutional referendum is peaceful. (The European Union [moved yesterday to loosen](#) some travel and business restrictions on Mugabe's inner circle).

Although the window of opportunity for such a deal is closing fast, Zuma could make a last-ditch attempt to negotiate an agreement that would allow the securocrats to retire comfortably from politics, an unsavory but perhaps necessary option [I outlined in January 2012](#).

Despite the encouraging breakthrough on a new constitution, due to the continued prominence of security officials and militias in electoral politics, as well as Mugabe's penchant for informal rule, the approval of a new charter alone is unlikely to prevent violence in subsequent general elections. □

# TWO YEARS AFTER INDEPENDENCE, SOUTH SUDAN STRUGGLES TO BUILD A VIABLE STATE

BY STEFAN WOLFF  
24 JUN 2013

When South Sudan formally declared its independence from the Republic of Sudan in July 2011, jubilant celebrations in the world's newest country were almost equally matched by gloomy predictions about a failed state in the making. The past two years have done little to dispel the dire predictions that institutions in the South would not be able to cope with the enormous challenges of building a viable state.

While not formally ranked in the [2012 Fund for Peace Failed States Index](#), the available data suggest that only three countries in the world score worse on indicators of state failure. This is also borne out in the latest "[Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan](#)" (.pdf), from March, which documents continuing anti-government and intercommunal violence, serious human rights violations, massive economic problems, widespread food insecurity, tense relations with Sudan, a steady stream of refugees from the North and high levels of internal displacement. While the report also notes some improvements compared to last year, South Sudan clearly has a long way to go on the road to stability.

Yet, [the pattern of developments](#) over the past two years does not suggest that there will be any significant improvements anytime soon. This is primarily because South Sudan's problems are of a long-standing, systemic and regionally embedded nature. Resolving them will require concerted local, regional and global efforts, and the conditions for this to happen simply will not materialize for the foreseeable future.

To begin with, South Sudan continues to face multiple security challenges. The government has been able to deal quite effectively with some of the insurgencies it faced, aided by the significant efforts of a fledgling but [increasingly important civil society](#). However, at least one rebel group, led by David Yau Yau, has remained a potent challenger, [allegedly receiving support](#) (.pdf) from Sudan. At the same time, significant intercommunal violence, often related to localized resource disputes or connected to the migration patterns of nomadic tribes along the now international border between the North and South has been persistent. In addition, the unresolved dispute between South Sudan and Sudan [over the oil-rich territory of Abyei](#) has repeatedly led to local flare-ups of violence. None of these conflicts has yet led to a renewal of all-out war between the two sides, but, [amid regular mutual recrimination](#) about support for rebel movements on the respective other side of the border, major military hostilities between North and South remain a possibility.

None of these security challenges emerged at, let alone because of, South Sudan's independence. Indeed, they predate not only independence in 2011 but also [the Comprehensive Peace Agreement \(CPA\)](#) of 2005, which was meant to provide the institutional mechanisms to find solutions to them within a unified Sudan. Yet, as soon as political leaders in the North and South began to set their agendas toward establishing firm control in their respective territories, these problems were at

best temporarily contained so that they would not stand in the way of power consolidation and, for the South, independence.

The volatile security situation that South Sudan thus inherited—and has so far been unable to improve much—is further exacerbated by, and contributes to, [an economic and humanitarian crisis](#) that has engulfed the country also since before independence. Highly uneven economic development between North and South during the colonial and postcolonial period, two civil wars (1963-1972 and 1983-2005) and an economy highly, if not almost completely, dependent on oil have all contributed to a situation in which food insecurity and poverty are widespread. Public services—from healthcare and sanitation to education and utilities—are, despite some improvements, at best poorly performing, and at worst [absent from significant parts of the country](#) (.pdf).

South Sudan, a landlocked country that inherited the pre-existing South-North refinery and export infrastructure, [depends entirely on Sudan for oil exports](#), which make up the vast majority of government revenues. A yearlong dispute over transfer fees, beginning in January 2012, had only just been resolved when Sudan [threatened to block oil exports](#) again a few weeks ago.

The massive loss of revenue as a result of the 2012 dispute, and the demands on the budget as a result of the protracted security challenges that South Sudan continues to face, have left very little government funds to spend on addressing either the humanitarian crisis—caused in significant part by the influx of refugees from Sudan and by the internal displacement of people as a result of violent conflict in South Sudan—or dealing with the broader social and economic development agenda, including education and public infrastructure. While donors have, to some extent, [filled this gap](#), they are unable to resolve the underlying issues simply by pumping aid into the country, currently to the tune of \$1.3 billion annually.

The international community has, however, been instrumental in containing various crises in the postindependence period. The African Union and the United Nations, in particular, have been key brokers in preventing the escalation of violence between South Sudan and Sudan—especially over the Abyei dispute—and humanitarian agencies, such as the U.N. Refugee Agency and the World Food Program, have made significant contributions to alleviating the worst of the human suffering. Valuable as such interventions are in the short term, they remain stopgap measures with little or no contribution to sustainable long-term improvements.

South Sudan was born out of the desire of its people to become an independent state and break free from what was widely, and correctly, perceived as Northern domination and exploitation. Yet independence has not addressed the many underlying problems that still beset the country two years after it gained statehood, nor could it have. What is, above all, required to break free from the ongoing vicious cycle of interlocked and mutually reinforcing security and development challenges is leadership on both sides of the still-contested border established in July 2011, to enable both countries to establish levels of security and economic cooperation that will allow their citizens to prosper. □

# GUINEA INCHES TOWARD STABILITY

BY DANE F. SMITH  
13 MAY 2013

A recent series of violent incidents between opposition protesters and security forces in Conakry highlights the challenges impeding Guinea's political transition since the death in 2008 of Lansana Conte, Guinea's leader for 24 years. Despite some progress toward stability, the outcome of the transition remains uncertain.

The military coup launching the transition soon mobilized the civilian population into opposition; an unprovoked attack by members of the security forces in September 2009 on a protest rally in a Conakry stadium, including mass rapes, triggered a slow-motion progression toward elections. The maiming of junta leader Dadis Camara by a military rival opened the way to a transitional government that presided over an electoral process kept on course by potentially crippling international economic sanctions.

The multi-party elections of June 2010 were fiercely contested. Cellou Dallein Diallo of the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea, the leading Fouta candidate and a former prime minister under Conte, failed to win a first-round majority, [precipitating a second-round victory by longtime political exile Alpha Conde](#), who assembled an anti-Fouta coalition around his Rally of the Guinean People. However, the election of the National Assembly, originally scheduled for 2007, has been repeatedly postponed because of disagreement between the presidency and the largest opposition group, led by Diallo, over the composition of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), management of voter registration and voting rights for the Guinean diaspora.

Conde compromised on the CENI, appointing a new chairman and agreeing to include opposition parties and civil society. But he has rebuffed opposition demands for dismissal of the South African contractor for voter registration, which has been positively evaluated by the U.N. and the International Francophone Organization. Conde has also rejected opposition insistence on diaspora balloting in only three countries, arguing that a partial diaspora vote would favor the Fouta and be too costly. So legislative elections provisionally scheduled for later this month at the European Union's insistence will again be postponed. Not having a functioning electoral branch would seem a major defect in an aspiring democracy, but neither Conde nor the Diallo-led opposition appears to see the legislature as an urgent priority.

The impasse over the National Assembly reflects a major impediment to political stability: the persistence in Guinea of deep ethnic divisions. Sekou Toure, a Malinke, brought Guinea to abrupt independence from France in 1958 by mobilizing inter-ethnic support for his Guinea Democratic Party. In 1967, however, after an unsuccessful Portuguese attack on Guinea to neutralize rebels from Portuguese Guinea—now Guinea Bissau—Toure accused the Fouta of conspiracy with Lisbon and executed major Fouta leaders. Privileged Fouta economic status has helped to sustain popular resentment against them. Conte, whose administration was ostensibly multi-ethnic, subsequently repressed the Malinke and concentrated power in his Soussou group. After his death, the ethni-

cally and religiously diverse people of the Forest region, who had always felt politically excluded, rallied behind Camara. A major subtext of Diallo's 2010 campaign was that the time had come for a Foula president. His loss accentuated the country's deepest ethnic fissure: between the Foula and the rest of the population.

In one important respect Guinea has achieved progress. The threat of a return to military rule, discredited by the excesses of the Camara junta, has receded. Security sector reform, promoted by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and international donors, has shrunk the Guinean army, once among Africa's largest. The retirement of hundreds of senior officers has created opportunities for younger ones. Perhaps most importantly, army personnel recognize that access to future lucrative international peacekeeping assignments would be foreclosed by another military takeover.

Finally, deep-seated government corruption is a major constraint to improved governance. Under Toure's Stalinist single-party regime, the state was the only source of income. Under Conte's looser neo-patrimonial rule, entrepreneurial opportunities were greater but embedded in a crony capitalism feeding on official bribery. Conde may have hoped to sack the entrenched apparatchiks but, as a longtime exile surrounded by an inner circle of fellow exiles, he soon found himself dependent on some of the insiders to keep government functioning. He insisted on a review of international contracts concluded in the recent period, but it was neither completed nor acted upon. Thus there has been slow progress in finalizing the projects to develop further Guinea's bauxite reserves—the largest in the world—and to exploit untapped iron ore, to say nothing of taking advantage of Guinea's potential agricultural riches. Promising offshore seismology has yet to generate a deep-water well yielding commercial quantities of oil. Nonetheless, the danger that Guinea might join neighboring Guinea-Bissau as a narcostate, alive in 2008-2009, has faded for now.

Whether or not the legislative elections go forward in the near future, prospects for institutional consensus are dim. Conde lacks the power to defeat decisively the Foula opposition, and Diallo will find it difficult to forge alliances to break up the anti-Foula bloc in the 2017 presidential election. In the meantime, corruption will continue to squeeze economic growth. However, it is unlikely that popular frustration will boil over into revolution or civil war. Politics is to a large extent a Conakry preoccupation. Despite low per capita income Guinea is not desperately poor. People are reasonably well fed and clothed, even in the countryside; food supplies are adequate in this well-watered land. Moreover, Guinean elites are acutely conscious of the ravages of civil war in Liberia and Sierra Leone and reflexively stop short of ethnic combat. The Foula are reluctant to push conflict to the brink, recognizing they have the most to lose.

Guinea's current relative stability, compared with 2008-2009, will likely keep it off this year's crisis priority list for ECOWAS, France and the U.S., unless the current episodic violence escalates sharply. At the same time, the country's slow progress on governance and its reputation for corruption will dampen the enthusiasm of major donors and deter investors, thereby holding back the economic and social changes required for Guinea to emerge from a half-century of backwardness. □

# COTE D'IVOIRE'S OUATTARA PUTS ECONOMIC RECOVERY AHEAD OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION

BY ARTHUR BOUTELLIS  
19 MAR 2013

Two years after the end of Cote d'Ivoire's post-election crisis, which saw more than 3,000 people killed, much uncertainty remains over the direction the country will take. The crisis, triggered by former President Laurent Gbagbo's [refusal to leave office](#) after losing the November 2010 presidential election to current President Alassane Ouattara, was itself the last chapter of a decade-long conflict that had profoundly divided the country and its people. Though some steps toward normalization have been taken, they have not led to a broader national reconciliation.

On one hand, Ouattara has already achieved a great deal, restarting the Ivorian economy and regaining for his country much of the regional and international stature it had lost. From an initial focus on a makeover of the economic capital, Abidjan, the Ouattara government has since secured significant debt cancellation and donor funding in support of its 2012-2015 national development plan. The plan includes infrastructure projects—a hydroelectric dam, roads, bridges and ports—as well as investment in key sectors such as oil and gas, cocoa, coffee and mining. Private investors are also slowly joining the recovery. Earlier this month, India's Tata Steel announced that it would form a consortium to finance construction of a railway line from its iron concessions in western Cote d'Ivoire to the port of San Pedro.

Meanwhile, despite facing many challenges at home, Ouattara chaired the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2012 through crises in Mali and Guinea Bissau, winning praise from West African leaders, who just renewed his mandate at the head of the subregional organization for another year. He has also secured the return of the African Development Bank's headquarters—which were relocated from Abidjan to Tunis at the height of the Ivorian crisis in 2002—for later this year.

On the other hand, progress on the political and security fronts has been slow. One of Ouattara's very first decisions in office was to create, on March 17, 2011, the Republican Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (known by the French acronym FRCI) to unify the ex-rebel New Forces (FN) that had supported him during the 2011 crisis with the Ivorian National Defense and Security Forces, in the hopes of paving the way for broader national reconciliation. Two years later, however, little progress has been achieved in security sector reform, and the FRCI [have been accused of committing widespread human rights violations](#) against supporters of Gbagbo.

Ouattara taking over the defense portfolio from ex-FN leader Guillaume Soro, as well as the creation of the National Security Council, the development of a national security sector reform strategy and the establishment of a new single authority for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration during the second half of 2012 seemed to indicate a renewed political commitment to security sector reform. In practice, however, initial efforts have for the most part benefited elements associated with the former FN, and the government has focused its resources on a few well-equipped elite security units rather than undertaking broader reform aimed at rebuilding trusted and accountable security forces.



A series of attacks in summer 2012 that targeted the FRCI and aimed to destabilize Ouattara's government may be partly responsible for the regime's current approach. The attacks were allegedly planned and financed by networks affiliated with Gbagbo and operating from neighboring Ghana and Liberia. It remains to be seen if the recent high-profile arrests in Ghana of former pro-Gbagbo youth leader Charles Ble Goude and spokesman Justin Kone Katinan will deal a definitive blow to these networks.

A greater concern in the medium term, however, may be the stalled reconciliation process. In spite of Ouattara's early public speeches on the need for forgiveness and reconciliation, and his call for the return of exiled Ivorians, [he has been criticized](#) for continuing down Cote d'Ivoire's "current path of victor's justice." While trials of pro-Gbagbo military leaders suspected of having committed crimes during the post-election crisis [started in October 2012](#), no moves have been announced against ex-FN leaders, who were also responsible for grave crimes but now occupy key positions in the FRCI. Meanwhile, with the government having ratified the Rome Statute in February, the International Criminal Court has confirmed charges against Gbagbo for his role in the post-electoral violence.

None of this bodes well for the upcoming local elections set for April 21, which the pro-Gbagbo opposition party the Ivorian Popular Front has already indicated it will boycott, nor for the larger national reconciliation process, which has yet to take place. The United Nations, which recently assessed the possibility of scaling back its 10,000-strong peacekeeping operation in Cote d'Ivoire, whose mandate runs through July 31, 2013, has expressed particular concern about the continuing risk of violence in the western part of the country, where much of the post-electoral violence took place and recurrent land disputes fuel political and ethnic tensions.

In this context, many observers question whether Ouattara's focus on economic growth, confirmed by the appointment of Daniel Kablan Duncan, an economist and former finance minister, as the head of the new government in November 2012, can successfully bring stability and peace to a country that remains so divided politically. Much may also depend on the ability of the Ivorian government to quickly spread the dividends of the economic recovery beyond Abidjan to people in all parts of the country and all segments of society, particularly the youth, regardless of how they voted in November 2010, before Ouattara runs for a second term in the 2015 presidential election. Unfortunately, he may have little incentive to open political space and move the reconciliation process forward. Given the role ECOWAS may play in the ongoing Sahel crisis, the international community may also prefer looking the other way for the time being.

But if not accompanied by political inclusiveness and national reconciliation, economic and security reforms risk once again crystallizing the country's divides ahead of the 2015 election. □

# AFRICAN UNION'S COMPLICATED RECORD BELIES CONTINENT-SPANNING NARRATIVES

BY JAMES HAMILL

07 FEB 2013

A little more than a decade ago, in July 2002, the African Union (AU) was formed against an inauspicious backdrop. For Africa, the previous decade had been defined by conflict, state collapse, failed peacekeeping missions and even genocide. So dire had Africa's condition become that in May 2000 the Economist captured its malaise under the infamous rubric, "the hopeless continent." The AU's mission over the past decade was in part to challenge and rewrite such bleak narratives. Looking back, its record is mixed, particularly in its attempts to position itself as the principal vehicle for the advancement of democratization on the continent.

The AU's formation marked a break with the depressing history of its flawed predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which proved largely irrelevant as many African states descended into civil war or despotism and the continent became a theater of Cold War competition. The AU's novel features included an explicit commitment to democratization and good governance and a recognition of the legitimacy of intervention in the event of crimes against humanity or genocide. The latter was an early articulation of the "responsibility to protect" doctrine that placed the AU ahead of the United Nations itself and represented a firm repudiation of the OAU's noninterference doctrine. In addition, the AU rejected unconstitutional changes of government, with suspension from AU membership for those states where such changes occurred. The AU has also been active in designing a new continental security architecture, and has already conducted peace operations with varying degrees of effectiveness in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia.

But in its second decade, the AU [faces a range of problems](#). These include coordinating with various subregional bodies; the need to build capacity for peacekeeping operations and translate the "African solutions to African problems" mantra into reality; and preventing the possibility, common to all multilateral bodies, that the AU may become a vehicle for the interests of the major powers within it, in this case South Africa and Nigeria, while at the same time preventing tensions between the two from fatally undermining the organization.

One major issue stands out, however, and that is the question of democratic government. The AU's history to date may be viewed as a modest success in this regard, as democratic government, however imperfect, has been accepted as the norm, and military rule as an aberration. How the AU addresses democratization moving forward will shape the organization's future prospects and determine whether it does indeed represent a definitive break with the OAU.

Notwithstanding the AU's stated commitment to promoting democratic governance, its record is uneven and deficient in three important respects. First, the paradox of African multilateralism continues to haunt the AU as it does subregional bodies throughout the continent: Many of the African regimes responsible for implementing the noble democratic ideals contained in the founding documents of intergovernmental organizations have nothing to gain from doing so. In fact, they may have much to lose, as democratization would erode the very basis of elite rule anchored in

manipulated political processes, corruption and neo-patrimonialism.

Second, while the AU is very clear in rejecting unconstitutional takeovers, it has had very little to say about regimes that have come to power constitutionally but now sustain themselves by violence, electoral rigging or a simple refusal to accept defeat. Indeed the current regional and subregional practice is to indulge, even reward, such tactics by cementing incumbent leaders and regimes in place at the heads of post-election governments of national unity, while the actual electoral victors have to be content with the more junior role, as in Zimbabwe and Kenya. Multilateral organizations have often demonstrated an instinctive solidarity with abusive African regimes at the expense of both African peoples and the democratic values contained in those organizations' founding charters. Moreover, although the AU has formally recognized that sovereignty is no longer absolute but conditional and that states cannot mistreat their citizens with impunity, both individual states and African multilateral bodies retain a strong attachment to traditional Westphalian models of sovereignty.

Finally, the AU is in essence an elite, top-down project, which, thus far, has not sufficiently engaged civil society groupings, far less people at the grassroots level. This deficiency has to be addressed as a matter of urgency if pan-Africanism is ever to move beyond the confines of the African intelligentsia and become a broadly shared -- and democratizing -- experience.

Without a shared commitment to democracy and constitutional government across the continent, there will be an absence of the shared values or sameness that sustains and underpins successful security regimes elsewhere. Either this will make it increasingly difficult for African states to speak with one voice on global issues, or it will mean that the AU generates a lowest-common-denominator politics with agreement reached only at the blandest level. In the worst-case scenario, that consensus may even be forged around authoritarian principles or a knee-jerk defense of authoritarian regimes.

The AU is to be commended for advancing discussion on key issues and for seeking to promote improved democratic standards, though whether it deserves to be called a "norm entrepreneur" is more questionable in view of the preceding discussion. It is perhaps the definitive example of a work in progress and has made a useful contribution demonstrating that the "hopeless continent" narrative is a highly simplistic means of debating Africa's myriad complexities. But neither can the AU's many challenges be airbrushed away as part of an equally misleading "Africa rising" thesis.

What we may be moving toward instead is a situation in which the very term "Africa" loses its utility [as a multitier continent emerges](#), in which some regions perform better than others in the security sector, and where states in one subregion may have more in common in terms of democratic governance with states in other subregions than with their immediate neighbors. None of this, however, will be effectively captured by one-dimensional narratives of heroic achievement or abject failure. Therefore the AU is likely to continue to disappoint both its detractors and its pan-African enthusiasts. □

# **Security and Conflict**

# NIGERIA'S FAULT LINES THREATEN JONATHAN'S PRESIDENCY

BY ALEX THURSTON  
02 APR 2013

Nigeria's Goodluck Jonathan became acting president in February 2010 following the incapacitation of his predecessor Umaru Yar'Adua. Elected in his own right in April 2011, Jonathan now stands near the midpoint of his first full term in office. His People's Democratic Party (PDP), which has won every election since Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999, dominates the executive and legislative branches of the federal government and governs 23 of Nigeria's 36 states. The advantages of incumbency and party dominance will likely assure Jonathan another term when Nigeria votes again in 2015. Yet insecurity, corruption and stalled policy implementation have provoked broad criticism of his performance, and the remainder of his term is likely to be characterized by high levels of political tension.

Jonathan's difficulty in reducing violence was on display earlier this month in the northeastern city of Maiduguri, Borno state, which Jonathan visited for the first time as president on March 8. Maiduguri is the nerve center of the Muslim militant group Boko Haram, whose name is a Hausa phrase that connotes opposition to Western education and culture. Boko Haram previously launched uprisings in 2003-2004 and 2009, before Jonathan became president. Since September 2010 the group has attacked numerous government, Christian and infrastructural targets and has become a central challenge for Jonathan's administration. Along with its splinter group Ansar al-Muslimin (Arabic for "The Defenders of Muslims"), Boko Haram has kidnapped foreigners, including a French family seized last month in Cameroon. The Nigerian military's Joint Task Force [has occupied Maiduguri](#) since June 2011, and has repeatedly claimed success in the fight against terrorism. But [its repressive tactics](#) themselves have partly fueled Boko Haram's grievances.

Within hours of Jonathan's departure from Maiduguri, [seven bombs exploded](#). Days later, two PDP officials [were killed in Borno](#). As a result, Jonathan's trip, rather than inspiring confidence in his ability to manage the crisis, [drew criticism from local residents](#) and [media commentators](#). Jonathan remains unpopular in the north, where he [received less than 20 percent of the vote](#) in many states, including Borno, in 2011. The trip heightened the contrast between Jonathan and an emerging coalition of opposition politicians, the All Progressive Congress, who [held their own meeting](#) -- without violence -- in Maiduguri on Feb. 28. Boko Haram thus threatens not only Nigeria's security but also the president's political fortunes.

Persistent corruption, both at the highest levels of government and in ordinary people's daily lives, has also sapped confidence in Jonathan, though it is a problem that predates his presidency. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index showed Nigeria [occupying roughly the same rank in 2009](#) -- 130th out of 180 countries -- [as in 2012](#) -- 139th out of 176 countries. Yet many Nigerians and outside observers believe that corruption is the core problem underlying the country's other challenges, from poverty to security, and many have seen Jonathan's failure to reduce corruption as a broader political failure.

Jonathan's recent pardon of Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, a former governor and Jonathan's political mentor who was convicted of corruption charges in 2007, sparked outrage and further undermined his anti-corruption credentials. Alamieyeseigha governed Bayelsa state from 1999 to 2005, with Jonathan as his deputy. In 2005, when Alamieyeseigha was arrested in London on money laundering charges and subsequently impeached, Jonathan became governor -- a turning point in the current president's political ascent. Some observers read in Jonathan's pardon of Alamieyeseigha a willingness to prioritize political relationships over accountability.

Bayelsa's location in the Niger Delta, the heart of Nigeria's oil production, highlights the gap between rich and poor in Nigeria. While politicians like Alamieyeseigha accumulate fortunes, many delta residents confront environmental degradation and grinding poverty. Militants there, demanding a greater share of oil profits for local communities, rebelled against the federal government from 2006 to 2009, when Yar'Adua extended amnesty to the rebels. Jonathan has continued the program, but it is [scheduled to end in 2015](#), and oil theft by disaffected residents and former militants who complain that amnesty has failed to provide jobs is rising.

Meanwhile, despite international praise for his economic team -- especially Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a former World Bank official -- Jonathan has also struggled, and at times failed, to implement his economic agenda, which has been dogged by controversy. The administration advocates budgetary reform, even if it means economic pain for ordinary Nigerians. Critics charge that privatization initiatives and austerity measures will shrink the meager benefits citizens receive from the state while expanding opportunities for politicians to steal public money. In January 2012, Jonathan abolished subsidies on fuel, leading Lagos, Kano and other cities to erupt in protest. The administration [partly reinstated the subsidies](#), but the debate remains unsettled. Similarly, a bill meant to reform the oil industry has met countless delays. Many observers still expect it to pass. But [as one Nigerian journalist wrote](#), recent debate in the Senate over the bill "further exposed our delicate [regional] fault lines" -- the same fault lines that Jonathan has encountered in other domains, from his own election to the security crisis in the north.

The more Jonathan flounders, the more opposition he will face from within his party. Some northern PDP members resent him for disrupting an internal party agreement to rotate the presidency between the north and the south. Some southwestern members feel that Jonathan has excluded them as well, and that he favors members of his ethnic Ijaw group. The opposition's attempts at coalition-building give the PDP an incentive to preserve party unity, but regional rivalries and a multiplicity of big personalities within the PDP may produce a bruising nomination fight in 2015.

With two years left before Nigerians return to the polls, Jonathan faces an array of challenges, a host of critics and a list of unkept promises. In 2010 and 2011, Jonathan defied predictions of his political demise during his tumultuous journey from vice president to acting president to president. The PDP's structural dominance may ensure his victory in 2015. Yet security threats, corruption issues and a stalled legislative agenda will continue to consume much of his energy and limit his effectiveness. □

# GLOBAL INSIDER: ANY BOKO HARAM DEAL MUST ADDRESS NIGERIA'S STRUCTURAL INSTABILITY

## *An interview with Jennifer Giroux*

BY THE EDITORS

29 APR 2013

On April 24, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan [inaugurated a committee](#) charged with opening negotiations with militant group Boko Haram and preparing for a possible amnesty deal. In an email interview, [Jennifer Giroux](#), a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich who specializes in conflict in energy-producing and transit regions, explained what the process might entail as well as the obstacles it faces.

**WPR:** *What would the amnesty proposal currently under consideration for Boko Haram involve?*

**Jennifer Giroux:** At the moment there is not an amnesty deal but rather the organization of resources to develop an amnesty framework. The government recently created two committees -- one to examine the proliferation of small arms and the other to engage key leaders of Boko Haram and identify the key elements of a possible amnesty agreement. Obviously disarmament will be part of any amnesty discussion; however, Boko Haram has more concrete demands, such as the release of incarcerated members. What the amnesty should involve, however, is another question. The north, where Boko Haram is active, is the poorest region in the country and is awash with youth who are flocking to urban centers where they are jobless and not engaged. There are certain demographic and political components of this crisis that cannot be ignored. Any amnesty proposal should have short- and long-term objectives that on the one hand seek to put an end to the political violence -- not just that perpetrated by the Islamist insurgency but also by military forces in the region -- and on the other hand develop and implement solutions to address the structural preconditions fueling instability. In this respect the amnesty can be viewed as opening a door to address the region's underlying issues.

**WPR:** *What lessons can Nigeria learn for this case from its amnesty for the southern Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)?*

**Giroux:** The situation in the north is very different from in the south, and yet the Niger Delta amnesty seems to be the model. The crisis in the north is nested within a religiously motivated insurgency and political context where there has been a collapse and fragmentation of political and religious authority as well as elite bargaining and zonal agreements. The insurgency in the Niger Delta was born out of socio-economic and environmental grievances, and in particular a call for a greater share of oil revenue. Both regions, however, share a sense of marginalization. Perhaps the most plausible lesson is to avoid creating an amnesty program that is simply a payment scheme to buy off insurgents. This has been the case in the Niger Delta, and hence low-level violence in the region has persisted. The peace there is tenuous at best. A holistic approach is needed that offers true pathways for engagement, particularly for the youth. This would include addressing issues of marginalization as well as the significant and myriad demographic, economic and political challenges.

**WPR:** *What are the major obstacles to a successful amnesty deal for Boko Haram?*

**Giroux:** There are three prominent issues. First, if we refer only to Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, the purported head, recently stated that it is the Nigerian government that should be asking for a pardon, not the other way around. Thus, it seems that at this stage it is not certain that there will be buy-in from Boko Haram. Second, the longer this goes on the more complicated it becomes. Boko Haram has splintered, resulting in the formation of many other nodes of the insurgency, one being the breakaway group Ansaru. Today, the insurgency is much more diffused and nebulous. If Boko Haram agrees to an amnesty, can Shekau truly speak for the splinter groups and guarantee their involvement? That remains to be seen. Third, the government cannot ignore the political dimension of this crisis -- with the 2015 presidential election approaching, tensions between Muslim and Christian communities will continue to grow so long as the insurgency persists. □



# BETTER INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION NEEDED TO COMBAT RISING WEST AFRICAN PIRACY

BY JAMES M. BRIDGER  
02 APR 2013

Nigeria is no stranger to maritime disorder. In the mid- to late-2000s, the political and criminal insurgency waged by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) [cost the country an estimated \\$1.5 billion](#) in lost annual revenue through oil theft, attacks against petroleum infrastructure and piracy. A measure of peace arrived in 2009, when the government in Abuja introduced an amnesty program that provided skills training and cash stipends for some 26,000 former militants and rewarded their leaders with lucrative security contracts.

By 2011, however, a new kind of maritime crime was emerging in the region: the short-term hijacking of oil tankers and subsequent theft and black market sale of their multimillion-dollar cargos. Though the syndicates responsible are based in Nigeria, the first tankers targeted were in the waters of neighboring Benin, [where at least 20 such vessels were attacked in 2011](#) (.pdf). The following year the new piracy model had moved to the littoral of Togo, where the International Maritime Bureau recorded 15 similar attacks in 2012. The pirates have now extended their operations further westward [into the waters of Côte d'Ivoire](#), where two tankers have already been hijacked and pilfered this year.

While large-scale cargo theft is new to the region, the Niger Delta has also witnessed a resurgence in kidnappings. In the past four months, six vessels have been boarded and 24 expatriate sailors taken hostage for ransom. Meanwhile, [the use of hijacked vessels as offshore motherships](#) has allowed pirates to conduct attacks up to 90 nautical miles from the coast, well outside the range of local security forces.

Those behind this new wave of piracy and oil theft have dropped the political and social grievances associated with MEND and are now functioning as a highly lucrative criminal enterprise. Pirate gangs [are reportedly “sponsored by powerful people,”](#) including Nigerian government officials and oil industry executives, who provide financing and information about the cargo, route and security detail of targeted vessels. Further internationalizing the Nigeria-based operations are nationals from neighboring countries [recruited for their local knowledge](#) and political connections, and alleged Lebanese and Russian criminal interests that [help facilitate the black market sale of stolen cargo](#). In this sense, piracy is entwining with other forms of transnational organized crime in West Africa, including weapons trafficking, human and drug smuggling and illegal fishing.

The resulting maritime insecurity is fast becoming a developmental crisis for the Gulf of Guinea's littoral states. The U.S. consul-general in Lagos, Nigeria, Jeffrey Hawkins, recently remarked that [the deteriorating maritime security environment has become](#) “a major disincentive for foreign direct investment and a major burden to ships which have to travel through the region in convoy.”

In terms of national response, Nigeria's Joint Task Force [has a mandate to suppress piracy, oil theft and pipeline vandalism](#) in the Niger Delta. While these operations [have had some success at](#)

destroying illegal refineries and seizing vessels carrying stolen oil, they face a number of impediments. The campaign against Boko Haram and other jihadi splinter groups in northern Nigeria draws precious military resources away from naval forces, meaning that joint maritime operations usually amount to intermittent sweeps, rather than a continuous patrol presence. Even when suspected pirates are captured, they are rarely prosecuted, as the JTF lacks the authority to do so. Most importantly, entrenched corruption in the security services, judicial system and at all levels of government shields the kingpins of the “oil mafias” from arrest and trial.

Outside of Nigeria, the level of maritime security capacity is even lower, as neighboring states have only a handful of patrol boats among them. The Economic Community of West African States is positioning itself to develop a regional maritime strategy but “is hampered by political tensions and distrust of neighboring states toward Nigeria,” according to a recent International Crisis Group report. Only Nigeria and Benin have thus far engaged in joint patrols.

Recognizing the threat posed to regional peace and security, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2018 (.pdf) in 2011, which called on the international community to assist littoral states in the Gulf of Guinea through “information sharing, coordination improvement and capacity building.” The U.S. has taken the lead in this endeavor and now runs two annual multinational training and information-sharing exercises in West Africa as part of the Navy’s Africa Partnership Station (APS) program. The European Union recently launched a similar initiative, the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Program, which will use a nearly \$6 million budget to help train regional coastguards and establish an information-sharing network. Individual states with interests in the region, such as the U.K., France and China, have also provided training, equipment and vessel procurement on an ad hoc basis.

These types of initiatives are commendable, but a crisis of multinational concern requires a more holistic approach. For international partners, there needs to be a greater emphasis on providing training in investigative police work, intelligence gathering and judicial procedure. Multiple plans to develop a regional intelligence-sharing center need to be better coordinated, and with haste, as very little is currently known about how many attacks occur or where the gangs responsible for them operate.

Intelligence sharing, multilateral naval patrols and agreements on hot pursuit into neighboring waters are impeded by local sovereignty concerns, but Southeast Asia’s Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia provides a model of how these issues can be overcome and the benefits of doing so.

Finally, one cannot forget that crimes at sea are a manifestation of political and economic conditions ashore. For Nigeria in particular, economic development in coastal areas, transparent management of the oil industry and anti-corruption efforts are as important to fighting piracy as naval patrols and should be supported by the international community with the same vigor. □

# GLOBAL INSIDER: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM STALLING IN COTE D'IVOIRE

*An interview with Arthur Boutellis*

BY THE EDITORS

17 MAY 2013

This month, the Cote d'Ivoire government [announced a plan to repatriate 200 former rebel fighters](#) who had been exiled to Togo in the wake of Cote d'Ivoire's post-election violence in 2010. In an email interview, [Arthur Boutellis](#), a research fellow and adviser to the Peace Operations and Africa programs at the International Peace Institute, described the state of Cote d'Ivoire's security sector reform and the obstacles to further progress.

**WPR:** *What has been the recent trajectory of Cote d'Ivoire's security sector since the violence surrounding November 2010 elections?*

**Arthur Boutellis:** The security sector could have been a key driver of the national reconciliation process in Cote d'Ivoire. By creating the Force Republicaine de Cote d'Ivoire (FRCI) at the end of the electoral crisis, President Alassane Ouattara had opened the way for the unification of ex-rebel Forces Nouvelles (FN) and the former national Defense and Security Forces (DSF). Two years later, however, not much has happened on the security sector reform (SSR) front.

On paper, the process is moving forward: A national SSR strategy was developed; a census of the security forces launched; and a new single authority for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) was established in 2012. But in practice, the summer 2012 attacks and destabilization attempts by Gbagbo loyalists in neighboring Ghana and Liberia derailed the process. State security—focused on developing a few elite security units and increasing FRCI presence in the unstable western part of the country—has taken precedence over a genuine SSR that would aim at downsizing, depoliticizing and rebuilding professional security forces, accountable to the civilian leadership and accountable to the people.

The government has also continued down what rights groups have called [the path of victor's justice](#). No former FN element has yet been prosecuted for crimes committed during the post-electoral crisis or since, and they have kept old chains of command and continued past practices of trafficking in the new FRCI—as documented by last month's [U.N. Group of Experts report \(S/2013/228\)](#).

**WPR:** *What are the main obstacles to disarming and integrating militias loyal to former President Laurent Gbagbo?*

**Boutellis:** The main obstacle to disarming and integrating pro-Gbagbo former DSF and militia members is the stalled reconciliation process, illustrated by the recent boycott by Gbagbo's political party Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) of April 21 local and legislative elections. This is of course the shared responsibility of the two camps, but it shows that profound distrust remains.

By announcing last week the repatriation from Togo of about 200 pro-Gbagbo fighters, Ouattara's government may have wanted to show to the international community that the country is on the

path to reconciliation. But these fighters are not returning voluntarily and will not be offered the option to integrate the new FRCI; instead they will be forcibly disarmed and demobilized. [The remaining 84,000 or so Ivorian refugees](#), mostly in Liberia and Ghana, and 5,000 in Togo, are also still hesitant to return.

Another obstacle is the result of the military outcome of the post-electoral crisis, which means that Ouattara owes a lot to those FN rebels who ultimately brought him to power—helped by the French intervention. So although Ouattara may have been willing to push SSR by taking over the defense portfolio from ex-FN leader Guillaume Soro last year, he also probably faced strong resistance from within “his own camp.” It also explains why he has delayed addressing issues of justice and impunity within FRCI.

***WPR: What more needs to be done to make progress in security sector reform, and what role should the international community play?***

**Boutellis:** Because the attention of the international community is on neighboring Mali, where Ouattara is playing a key role as ECOWAS chairman and where Cote d’Ivoire is also sending troops, a push for genuine SSR is unlikely right now. Donor countries have also welcomed Ouattara’s early economic achievements; Cote d’Ivoire had a 9.8 percent economic growth rate in 2012. Indeed, SSR cannot and should not be seen in isolation; and while FRCI restructuring and civilian disarmament may be needed in the medium term, if hurried, such measures could unwittingly destabilize a still-fragile situation.

The “disarming of Ivorian minds” and an inclusive national reconciliation may be more important in the short term and could indeed be supported through economic recovery. The international community should however ensure that this recovery is equitable and inclusive, particularly of youth groups, and accompanied by political reconciliation ahead of the 2015 presidential elections. □

# POST-INTERVENTION PROSPECTS FOR MALI'S TUAREG: PART I

BY PETER DÖRRIE  
01 MAY 2013

*Editor's note: This is the first of a two-part series on Tuareg politics in northern Mali. Part I examines the factors shaping internal political development among Mali's Tuareg community. Part II will examine the factors shaping external relations among Mali's Tuareg, the Malian government and France.*

The crisis in Mali put the Malian Tuareg community at the center of international security concerns. But for all the attention that the “desert warriors” behind the armed uprising in northern Mali have received, little effort has been made so far to develop an understanding of the internal politics of the Tuareg community and how these have shaped -- and been shaped by -- recent events.

The present crisis started [with the rebellion of a secular Tuareg armed group](#), the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which was trying to establish an independent Tuareg state in northern Mali. The world started taking notice when the MNLA succeeded in taking over large swathes of territory with the help of a range of Islamist groups. One of these Islamist groups, Ansar Dine, was also made up largely of Tuareg fighters and led by the most famous Tuareg warlord of the rebellion of the 1990s, Iyad Ag Ghali. The MNLA was subsequently marginalized by the Islamist groups and ceded almost all territorial control to them.

When [French forces intervened](#) to keep the rebels from overrunning southern Mali in January, Ansar Dine was scattered and the MNLA rose to prominence again. Today the MNLA effectively controls the northeastern part of the country around the city of Kidal with the blessing of the French, though much to the chagrin of the Malian government in Bamako.

Tuareg politics can be extraordinarily complex. In the current situation, clan politics, traditional power structures, religion and personal conflicts all play an important role in shaping developments.

One of the most obvious factors driving internal politics among the Tuareg has been clan affiliation, which structures Tuareg society. In Mali, the most powerful clan is the Kidal-based Ifoghas, whose fighters have been at the heart of most Tuareg rebellions since the 1960s. The leader of the Ifoghas, known as the amenokal, is considered the most powerful traditional Tuareg ruler in the country.

However, the MNLA has been dominated since its founding in late-2011 by members of the Idnan clan. Prominent Ifoghas -- like Ag Ghali and Alghabass Ag Intallah, son of the current amenokal -- were denied leadership positions in the movement and instead founded Ansar Dine.

After briefly working with the MNLA in the beginning of the rebellion, Ansar Dine quickly outmaneuvered the secular group by partnering with the more extreme al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb

and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, both groups dominated by non-Tuareg.

There is little indication that the current conflict fundamentally changed the distribution of power and relationships among the various clans, but it profoundly impacted the standing of the principal leaders of the rebellion. Ag Ghali, together with most of the Ansar Dine leadership, is now in hiding and, in the words of Andy Morgan, a specialist on Tuareg culture and society, “an outcast.” Ag Intallah managed to jump the sinking ship of Ansar Dine in time by forming a breakaway faction called the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA). The MIA immediately struck a conciliatory tone with the MNLA, and the two groups can now be considered one entity.

But while Ag Intallah has been spared Ag Ghali’s fate, the MIA leader’s earlier alignment with Ansar Dine and its extremist ideology has nonetheless sullied his reputation and called into question whether he will succeed his father as amenokal, as was expected before the recent crisis started. Even more dramatically, it may also have undermined the influence of the current amenokal, Intallah Ag Attaher. While widely respected after 50 years in office, the amenokal’s position isn’t formally invested with any power, and Attaher’s authority may have suffered from his apparent inability to rein in his own son.

Moreover, the amenokal is not only a political leader, but also an important religious figure. Ag Intallah’s decision to subordinate himself to Ag Ghali’s self-declared military-religious leadership further tarnished his image in the eyes of many Tuareg: Ag Ghali seemed to reach beyond his proper place in Tuareg society, and Ag Intallah joined him.

Ag Ghali’s religious agenda was hotly contested in the Tuareg community for other reasons as well. While Islam is the common Tuareg faith, the fundamentalist worldview of the Ansar Dine leadership clashed with many religious traditions in Mali’s north. Most analysts attribute the mass defection of MNLA fighters to Ansar Dine more to better pay and clan loyalty than to the appeal of its religious ideology. Backing up this view is the fact that support for Ansar Dine melted away after the French intervention put pressure on the movement and Ag Intallah and other leaders started to defect.

With Ag Ghali out of the picture and Ag Intallah and his father weakened, it seems like the MNLA, including General Secretary Bilal Ag Acherif and military chief Mohamed Ag Najem, has gained most from recent developments. But whether it will be able to convert the current momentum into concrete political results is questionable. One already apparent problem is a fundamental disconnect between the MNLA’s fighters and its political branch. The cooperation between both wings has been less than ideal since the beginning and may foreshadow further splits in the movement. One of these might already have occurred: Hama Ag Mahmoud, the MNLA’s representative in Mauritania, has been trying to rally support in Tuareg refugee camps in that country for negotiations and compromise with the Malian government in Bamako -- a goal that many hard-line MNLA fighters reject.

With most of Mali’s Tuareg population currently residing in refugee camps in neighboring countries, gauging their support for the various groups and individuals in Tuareg politics, already notoriously difficult under normal circumstances, is even harder today. But it is likely that most of them would prefer negotiations and peace over continued escalation, argues Morgan, as long as the Malian government finally gives in to some of the demands that have driven all the Tuareg rebellions since the 1960s: development and political autonomy for Tuareg communities in the north. But any diplomatic approach to resolving the core Tuareg grievances is complicated by the complexity of the triangle linking Paris, Bamako and the Tuareg north. □

# POST-INTERVENTION PROSPECTS FOR MALI'S TUAREG: PART II

BY PETER DÖRRIE  
02 MAY 2013

*Editor's note: This is the second of a two-part series on Tuareg politics in northern Mali. [Part I](#) examined the factors shaping internal political development among Mali's Tuareg community. Part II examines the factors shaping external relations among Mali's Tuareg, the Malian government and France.*

French forces are drawing down in Mali, with Paris claiming that much of their work fighting Islamists and terrorists in the Sahara desert is done and can now be left to the Malian army and its regional allies. An African Union force will be securing much of the territory regained from Islamist extremists until a U.N. peacekeeping mission is deployed later this year, but the secular, separatist Tuareg rebel group the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) remains in control of the northeastern part of the country around Kidal, with the tacit acceptance of the French. Meanwhile, there are still no political solutions on the table to address the underlying causes of the conflict that broke out in early 2012. As a result, the relationship among Bamako, Paris and the Tuareg remains precarious and characterized by mistrust and the potential for escalation.

Complicating the picture even further, France's immediate goals in Mali seem difficult to reconcile, if not even mutually exclusive. To keep Islamist and terrorist groups from re-establishing safe havens in Mali's north, a large and sparsely populated area where armed groups still hold several French hostages, the French government will be counting on cooperation with the MNLA. As a well-equipped, experienced fighting force that knows northern Mali extremely well, the Tuareg fighters are the perfect proxy for Paris. At the same time, Paris wants the Malian government, which has lacked any form of democratic legitimacy since a coup overthrew the elected government in March 2012, to hold elections in July.

But for the political and military leadership in Bamako, MNLA control over Kidal and the surrounding area is unacceptable. The MNLA in turn has already made it clear that it will not tolerate elections for a national government to be held in its territory in the absence of a signed, guaranteed peace agreement between the MNLA and Bamako.

It is highly unlikely that such an agreement could be negotiated before July. Up to now, Bamako and the MNLA have not even been involved in direct talks. The MNLA clearly sees no reason to compromise or soften its position: Its leaders feel that France needs them and their fighters, and the MNLA does not perceive the Malian army as a serious threat -- likely an accurate assessment.

The MNLA is currently the strongest political and armed group in the Tuareg community. While individual members of the MNLA's political leadership may be more open to negotiations and compromise with Bamako, its military wing will likely oppose every settlement that doesn't include far-reaching political autonomy for the Tuareg in Mali's north accompanied by promises to develop the region's sparse infrastructure and economy.

Agreeing to these demands would be political suicide for any politician in Bamako. Southern Malians overwhelmingly hold the MNLA responsible for the crisis that has befallen their country, and the apparent impotence of then-President Amadou Toumani Touré in the face of the Tuareg advance in early 2012 was one of the main motivations for the coup d'état that ousted him.

It is unlikely that France will put much pressure on the MNLA to compromise in the near term. At the moment, Paris needs the Tuareg more than the Tuareg need Paris. France clearly hopes to keep using the MNLA as a proxy force against criminal and terrorist groups in Mali's north, and is probably content to leave the Kidal region in the MNLA's hands if it has to. Allowing Mali's government to use force to disarm the MNLA would of course end any collaboration between France and the Tuareg and would also require the continued involvement of French forces in combat operations in Mali -- something that the French government clearly finds undesirable.

The French may also fear that alienating the Tuareg could drive them into the arms of more radical groups. Many members of the MNLA defected to the Islamist Ansar Dine last year, when Iyad Ag Ghali, Ansar Dine's Tuareg leader, offered them better pay and appealed to clan loyalties. The defectors returned to the nominally secular MNLA once an alliance with France seemed to be more beneficial, but the apparent flexibility of many Tuareg fighters in choosing their allies will make France careful not to cross them.

Regional expert Yvan Guichaoua of the University of East Anglia predicts that, because of this conflict of interests among Paris, Bamako and the Tuareg, elections are likely to be postponed to the end of 2013. This would leave more time for diplomatic activities and may also allow more diplomatically-minded elements of the MNLA to make their voices heard. But, Guichaoua cautions, "whether this time frame will be sufficient or not to reach an agreement also critically depends on the capacity of the Tuareg representatives in Kidal to speak with one voice, which has hardly been the case in the past."

An additional factor to consider is the U.N. peacekeeping force that will be deployed to northern Mali in the coming months. France has already pledged support for this mission, which, if it proves to be capable, could change Paris' calculation with regard to the MNLA. In particular, if France is no longer militarily dependent on the MNLA to maintain security in the north, it might be inclined to apply increased pressure on the group to come to terms with Bamako. Whether that will jeopardize the MNLA's willingness to cooperate in the fight against extremist groups, or even reignite the nationalist struggle against the Malian state, is still an open question. □



# FOR CHAD, OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE IN REGIONAL CRISES

BY ALEX THURSTON  
16 APR 2013

Chadian President Idriss Deby announced Sunday that the country [would withdraw its troops from northern Mali](#), after a suicide attack killed three Chadian troops Friday. The announcement reflects the uncertainties that surround Chad's increasingly prominent role in efforts toward regional stability.

In January, Chad [deployed soldiers](#) to assist the French military offensive in northern Mali. Chadian forces there, which currently number around 2,400, have seen some of the heaviest fighting in the war. Although French, Chadian, and Malian forces quickly conquered territory after the intervention began, the ensuing months have seen regular bombings and raids by Malian Islamists, as well as prolonged fighting in far-northern deserts. In late-February, at least 23 Chadian soldiers [died fighting Islamist rebels](#) in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains.

As France passes responsibility for securing northern Mali to African partners, Chad has positioned itself as a regional power. Yet different outlooks between Chad and Western powers, as well as instability in the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad's immediate neighbor, complicate Chad's ability to project leadership.

Like other regional leaders, Deby has stated that armed Islamism in Mali threatens his own country. Yet the crisis in Mali also presented an opportunity for Deby, who took power in a 1990 rebellion, to cultivate partnerships that might one day help him retain his job. Deby has faced several armed rebellions, including an uprising in early 2008 that [brought fierce fighting into the streets](#) of the capital, N'Djamena. Nevertheless, Deby has outlasted regional crises, including the conflict in Darfur and the Libyan civil war, [winning a fourth term](#) in an April 2011 presidential election boycotted by the Chadian opposition.

But the threat of domestic instability remains, even as relations with France have grown more complicated. French support helped Deby withstand rebellions in 2006 and 2008. But after 2008, France cooled toward Deby, who has been criticized for alleged mismanagement of oil revenues, harassment of the political opposition and corruption. The Malian crisis allowed Deby to strengthen Chad's relationship with France and boost his own image as a defender of stability in the Sahel region.

Once the French intervention began, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) accelerated the timetable of its own planned intervention and deployed troops under the banner of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali. ECOWAS currently has some 4,300 troops in Mali. Because Chad is not a member of ECOWAS, however, its forces operate in Mali as part of a direct partnership with France, one on which Paris has leaned heavily.

Chadian soldiers have earned a reputation for skill at fighting in the desert, where climactic condi-

tions sometimes daunt other African troops. This month, France [began drawing down](#) from around 4,000 troops to a projected 2,000 by July of this year, with the goal of ultimately reducing the number to a force of 1,000, dedicated to counterterrorism and stabilization operations. The United Nations envisions the eventual deployment of some 11,200 peacekeepers and counterterrorist experts to Mali. In his announcement of the Chadian withdrawal, Deby said Chadian forces will still be available to participate in that mission. But Chad was expected to retain a key role until multinational forces are in place.

That has now been complicated by Deby's announcement, which underscores the divergent views among Chad, France and the United States on Mali's future and the ability of African forces to restore stability. In March, Chadian Foreign Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat [called for caution](#) about Mali's future, saying the dangers of Islamist violence were still present. Deby has repeatedly expressed frustration with other African governments and the international community, [complaining of "total confusion" around Mali](#) in December 2012 and [telling ECOWAS in February](#) that it was time for "action." While Chad has been willing to shoulder some of the military burden in northern Mali, Chadian authorities were reluctant to see France draw down and are concerned that other African troops will not arrive soon enough -- and in sufficient numbers -- to prevent continued conflict.

For Deby, the recent Chadian casualties vindicate those concerns, which echo those of the Pentagon. This month, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Michael Sheehan [called ECOWAS](#) "a completely incapable force." With France drawing down its forces, Washington was looking more to Chad as a key actor in Mali. But the withdrawal of French troops [left Chad more vulnerable](#) to guerrilla attacks similar to last week's.

Chad, meanwhile, faces trouble closer to home. In March, the Seleka rebel coalition in the CAR toppled President Francois Bozize. During Seleka's initial offensive in December, Chad deployed troops to protect the capital, Bangui, [yet Bozize has accused Deby](#) of covertly supporting Seleka during its final push. Whatever the case, a rebellion on Chad's doorstep may stir doubts in Washington and Paris regarding Chad's credentials as a force for Sahelian stability. Maintaining a deployment in Mali while preventing the spillover of conflict into its own borders would also have stretched the capacities of the Chadian military.

The Malian crisis gave Chad greater prominence as a regional actor. Chad's military became a key partner for France in desert fighting, and Deby made his voice heard in Paris, at ECOWAS summits and elsewhere. In the long term, Deby may hope that Chadian involvement in Mali will yield stronger partnerships with France, other African nations and the United States. Yet the Chadian withdrawal from Mali could call this into question, even as the rebellion in CAR highlights the instability that surrounds Chad itself. In pulling out of Mali, Deby increases the chances that the country's turmoil will further destabilize the region, and reduces the leverage with Paris that he has gained during the conflict. Yet France, by withdrawing quickly, and ECOWAS, by deploying slowly, have left him little choice. □

# SECURITY VACUUM THREATENS CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC'S POLITICAL TRANSITION

BY ALEX THURSTON  
22 MAY 2013

Since late-March, when the rebel coalition Seleka took power in the Central African Republic (CAR), security has broken down in the country. United Nations Representative Margaret Vogt [recently stated](#) that CAR has entered “a state of anarchy”; in April, rebel-appointed Prime Minister Nicolas Tiangaye [called for French and African help](#) in restoring order. With Seleka struggling to turn military triumph into durable rule, CAR’s neighbors will likely see an increase in the circulation of refugees, fighters and weapons.

Through March, international actors sought to keep deposed President Francois Bozize in power and peacefully resolve the conflict, which had reignited in December when Seleka seized several northern towns and threatened Bangui, the capital. At talks organized by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) on Jan. 11 in Libreville, Gabon, Bozize [pledged to form a national unity government](#), allow the opposition to select a prime minister, organize legislative elections and refrain from contesting presidential elections scheduled for 2016. In late-March, however, Seleka [resumed its offensive](#), complaining that Bozize had failed to honor the agreement.

After Seleka took Bangui, Bozize fled the country. Seleka commander Michel Djotodia immediately appointed himself transitional president.

ECCAS—comprising CAR, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of the Congo—subsequently held additional meetings aimed at resolving the crisis. At an April 3 summit in Chad, ECCAS [insisted on an 18-month political transition](#), rather than the three-year transition Djotodia had initially proposed. After CAR’s new National Transition Council agreed to this timeline, ECCAS [recognized Djotodia as CAR’s transitional leader](#) at an April 18 summit, also held in Chad.

CAR, a poor country that seldom makes headlines, has not received the same level of international attention as Mali, but instability in CAR carries risks for the region. The Lord’s Resistance Army, a Ugandan-born rebel movement active in Central Africa since the 1980s, could capitalize on chaos there, and refugee flows from CAR could exacerbate humanitarian and security crises in Sudan, Chad and elsewhere. The crisis in CAR, then, has drawn concern from France and surrounding countries.

France, the former colonial power in CAR, [stationed some 600 soldiers in the country](#) during the conflict to protect its citizens. ECCAS oversees the European Union-funded Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC), which had about 500 peacekeeping troops in CAR as of January. South Africa, under a bilateral agreement with Bozize, deployed around 400 troops to CAR during the rebellion. During their push into Bangui, Seleka fighters [clashed with FOMAC soldiers](#) and fought South African troops, [killing at least 13](#).

South Africa withdrew its soldiers from CAR following this incident, but President Jacob Zuma [has expressed willingness to redeploy them](#), this time as peacekeepers. FOMAC remains in CAR, [with 730 soldiers deployed](#) as of May; ECCAS plans to increase the force to 2,000. Chad [deployed troops to CAR](#) in December to protect Bozize, but Chad's role in the rebellion has been ambiguous. Bozize [has accused](#) Chadian President Idriss Deby of supporting Seleka. Reuters [calls Deby the "kingmaker"](#) in CAR, claiming that Bozize's unwillingness to include northern rebels in his government and his outreach to partners other than Chad led Deby to allow Seleka's push into Bangui, during which Chadian troops reportedly stood aside.

What are Seleka's plans? Under the 18-month transition timeline, Djotodia and the government headed by Tiangaye will promulgate a new constitution and organize elections. The 105-member National Transition Council, which includes politicians, Seleka appointees and civil society representatives, will participate in this process, at least by formally approving Djotodia's decisions. With military commanders dominating Seleka, however, [some analysts doubt](#) that the alliance can craft a sustainable political program.

In the short term, Seleka faces the challenge of establishing order. Following the capture of Bangui, Seleka forces [reportedly looted shops and raped and killed civilians](#). Killings in Bangui continued in April. These incidents raise questions about whether Seleka can control its fighters. Seleka fighters' [demands for payment](#) in May compound these concerns and suggest the potential for infighting within the coalition. Meanwhile, Seleka's behavior in Bangui [has generated some civilian resistance](#).

The possibility of fragmentation within Seleka also highlights the question of whether the new government can project authority throughout the country. According to French journalist Francois Misser, Bozize [struggled to control territory](#) beyond a roughly 60-mile radius around Bangui, which left CAR vulnerable to rebel uprisings and predation by the Lord's Resistance Army. Bozize's initial support, like Seleka's, [came from northern parts of CAR](#). Djotodia, too, may find that taking power in Bangui does not guarantee that his rule will extend to the prefectures. Favoring certain regions and crafting patronage networks [have been the preferred tactics](#), but also the ultimate downfall, of each of CAR's previous five heads of state.

What implications does the change of government in CAR have for its neighbors? First, there is the humanitarian impact of the violence. Some 37,000 refugees [have fled the country](#). Inside CAR, meanwhile, internal displacement, hunger and reduced aid and service delivery [have compounded pre-existing humanitarian crises](#), meaning CAR's neighbors will likely see further refugee flows in the coming months. Second, there is the interconnected nature of rebellions in this region—Seleka's alleged recruitment of Chadians, Sudanese, Libyans and other foreign nationals [contributes to the ongoing circulation of men and weapons in Central Africa](#). Chad, which recently put down a coup attempt; Sudan, which faces rebellions in Darfur and along its new border with South Sudan; the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the M23 rebellion continues in the east; and other countries in the region all likely find the situation in CAR concerning.

Even if some governments were quietly happy to see Bozize go, deterioration in CAR under Djotodia could change their minds. Although ECCAS and African governments are likely to remain deeply involved in CAR's crisis, FOMAC's 2,000 troops will likely prove unable to prevent internal violence or manage regional fallout. If Seleka proves unable to govern the country, further rebellions may arise, causing further bloodshed in CAR and alarm among its neighbors. □

# OLD IS NEW: M23, RWANDA AND CONFLICT IN THE EASTERN DRC

BY LAURA SEAY  
20 FEB 2013

Armed groups proliferate like rabbits in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. From the state's collapse in the early 1990s through two wars at the turn of the 21st century to today, the lack of government control over the country's territory makes it easy for a few dozen -- or a few thousand -- men to take up arms, tax local populations, exploit natural resources and engage in massive human rights abuses against civilian populations.

The DRC's numerous armed groups are formed for a diverse array of reasons, ranging from legitimate concerns over land rights in the country's eastern Kivu provinces to xenophobic discrimination against particular ethnic groups to a desire to control key trade routes or natural resource revenues. Taking names that almost invariably include the words "justice," "freedom" or "liberation," many groups fizzle within a few months or years, while others build enough strength and a strong enough financial base to sustain decades of sporadic, low-intensity fighting with DRC government forces and one another. Most are rarely mentioned or known outside of the region or even in Kinshasa, the country's capital city, 950 miles away.

In 2012, however, one new Congolese armed group managed to break through the veil of obscurity to grab international headlines. From its formation in April to its dramatic capture of Goma in November, the M23 movement has become one of the strongest eastern Congolese armed groups to arise in many years.

In many ways, what's old is new again with M23. The movement takes its name from March 23, 2009, the date when a now-defunct rebel movement called the National Congress for the People's Defense, known by the French acronym CNDP, agreed to stop its rebellion and integrate its forces into the Congolese national army, the FARDC. The CNDP's leader, Laurent Nkunda, was placed under house arrest in Rwanda, where he technically remains to this day.

Integration did not go as planned, however. Rather than submitting to the FARDC's central chain of command, the ex-CNDP officers and regular troops maintained parallel chains of command and essentially operated autonomously from 2009 to 2012. Meanwhile, the new leader of the ex-CNDP forces, Bosco Ntaganda, used his position within the FARDC to openly engage in outrageous levels of personal enrichment despite being under indictment by the International Criminal Court on war crimes charges.

Nevertheless, ex-CNDP forces played a particularly important role in supporting Congolese President Joseph Kabila's 2011 re-election campaign. Kabila was significantly less popular by 2011 than he had been when he was first elected in 2006, and he needed strong vote totals from the eastern provinces to make his re-election appear plausible, if not in the eyes of Congolese voters, then at least to the international community. The former CNDP appears to have done its part to ensure that Kabila "won" in the Masisi territory of North Kivu province, where its forces were widely accused of forcing citizens to vote for Kabila, in some cases at gunpoint.

Kabila's re-election was widely viewed as a sham, but for donor states that value stability over democracy in the DRC, his continuation as president was the preferred outcome. Behind closed doors, diplomats in Kinshasa made it clear to Kabila that the price of staying in office as the DRC's legitimate ruler was to stop allowing Ntaganda to operate freely in the east. Instead, they wanted Kabila to immediately arrest Ntaganda and dispatch him to The Hague for trial.

Kabila seemed to take this urging seriously, and there were slight indications in early 2012 that he might move to arrest Ntaganda in response to donor concerns. Meanwhile, resentment within the FARDC toward the ex-CNDP members was growing. Soldiers who were not ex-CNDP had been complaining bitterly for a year or more that Ntaganda and his forces enjoyed a privileged status within the army. Their assessment was correct: Because ex-CNDP forces controlled several major trade routes in North Kivu, they were able to tax road traffic, the mineral trade and civilians in areas under their control, to the great benefit of ex-CNDP soldiers' significantly augmented salaries. FARDC forces who had not been in the CNDP lacked access to such extensive revenue-generating activities and were often not even paid the meager salaries to which they were entitled.

Within the ex-CNDP ranks, concern about the group's status was also mounting. Some ex-CNDP forces felt the government had not fully lived up to its responsibilities under the 2009 integration agreement, especially in terms of granting members of the CNDP's political wing positions in government and resolving refugee return issues. Plans for a mutiny had been underway since 2011. When Kabila started to signal that he might arrest Ntaganda, ex-CNDP soldiers led by Sultani Makenga decided they needed to act. [As Jason Stearns documents](#) (.pdf), attempts at mutinies began in early 2012, but were not really successful until mid-April, when the Rwandan government moved to openly support the rebellion after Kabila signaled that ex-CNDP forces would be redeployed to other areas of the country. Rwanda's involvement in supporting M23 grew substantially as 2012 progressed, to the point that, according to the U.N. Group of Experts on the DRC, Human Rights Watch and other observers, Kigali supplied troops, training, weapons, ammunition and other forms of logistical and material support to the rebels. The Group of Experts went so far as to claim that Rwandan Defense Minister James Kabarebe was directing some forces fighting under the M23 banner. Later reports also suggested that longtime Rwandan ally Uganda was also supporting M23 forces, albeit in a much more limited manner.

Why does Rwanda support the M23 movement? The reasons are complex and deeply rooted in regional history. Though it claims to be multiethnic, the leadership of M23 is largely composed of Congolese Tutsis, a group that has historically been heavily discriminated against in eastern Congo. Along with their Kinyarwanda-speaking Hutu brethren, the Tutsis of the Congo are the descendants of people who migrated from Rwanda well before the establishment of the independent Congolese state. Rwandaphones, as Kinyarwanda speakers are known, include both Hutus and Tutsis. Some Rwandaphones were forced to migrate to what is now Congo under the Belgian colonial regime to work on North Kivu's fertile plantations. Others migrated on their own volition, seeking freedom from oppression on South Kivu's Haut Plateau.

The descendants of these migrants have historically faced accusations that they are foreign interlopers who are not really Congolese. Members of non-Rwandaphone ethnic groups in the Kivu provinces have long distinguished between themselves, whom they called "autochthones," meaning "sons of the soil," and Rwandaphones, who, not being native to the area, were considered foreigners by definition. As property ownership rights in Congo have traditionally been tied to citizenship, the question of Rwandaphone standing is no mere technicality. Given that land in the Kivus is among the most fertile territory in the world, all groups have an incentive to prove that they have the right to live there.

None of this should have mattered after 1960, when Congolese independence from Belgium was declared and a new constitution was enacted. The country's founding document, "[Le Loi Fondamentale de 1960](#)," does not even mention citizenship, leaving that question for later lawmaking. The 1964 constitution stated that persons whose ethnic groups were in Congo as of 1908 were

citizens, which certainly included some -- though not all -- Congolese Rwandaphones, both Hutu and Tutsi. But the citizenship rights of Congolese Rwandaphones remained contested through the reign of longtime Congolese President Mobutu Sese Seko. Mobutu was a master manipulator of his country's competing political forces, and he adeptly used Rwandaphone citizenship rights as a pawn in his endless political patronage games. Over the decades, Mobutu would grant and then deny Rwandaphone citizenship rights according to his need to win support from one group or the other. The prominent role played by some Congolese Rwandaphones in supporting Rwanda's invasion of the DRC during the 1998 war, and in the proxy rebel movement and government it set up, the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma), further increased autochthone suspicions that Congolese Rwandaphones were up to no good.

The postwar 2005 DRC constitution attempted to mitigate this problem by declaring that members of all ethnic groups whose ancestors were in Congo at the time of Belgium's 1885 colonial annexation were Congolese citizens. But the document does not list those groups by name, and as perception is often more important than reality, many eastern Congolese neither trust Rwandaphones nor believe that they have the right to own property or claim citizenship rights in the Kivus or anywhere else in Congo. Rwandaphones, particularly Tutsis, are often scapegoated as the cause of all the region's problems.

For most non-Rwandaphone eastern Congolese, M23 [is just another extension of Rwandaphone interference](#) in the affairs of the Kivu provinces, like the CNDP and the RCD-Goma before it. Moreover, as the RCD-Goma and the CNDP both received extensive financial, logistical and material support from the Tutsi-led government in Rwanda, many Congolese automatically assumed that the Rwandan state was playing a role in supporting M23 as well.

This perception is correct, though the reality on the ground is far more complicated than some narratives of the crisis suggest. While Tutsis in Rwanda's leadership certainly feel a strong sense of ethnic kinship with their Congolese counterparts, relations between and within the two groups are far from totally united. In recent years, many powerful Congolese Tutsis have felt betrayed by Kigali, arguing that Rwanda cares more about its interests than their own. Within both groups, there are splits over how to best pursue Rwandaphone interests in the region, as well as who should lead the movement to undertake such tasks. The formation of the M23 movement is the latest in a series of actions taken by independent actors who cooperate when doing so serves all their interests, but who do not hesitate to divide when their interests collide.

What are the common Rwandaphone interests in the region? Broadly speaking, there are three. First, both Rwandan and Congolese Tutsis perceive a need to protect their kin in the region. Due to the high levels of discrimination against members of their ethnic group -- and even against people perceived to be Tutsi because they have certain physical characteristics stereotypically associated with the Tutsi, such as being tall -- most Tutsi leaders share concerns that if there is not an armed Tutsi-led movement in the Kivus, Rwandaphones there will be in physical danger. Given that Rwandaphone university students [were among those attacked by mobs](#) in Goma following the M23 mutiny, these fears are not entirely unfounded, though the actual threat and actions taken against their community is often overstated by Rwandaphones eager to stir up support for their position.

In addition, the ongoing presence of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, known by the French acronym FDLR, in North Kivu is perceived as a serious security threat by Rwanda, even though the FDLR's size and capabilities have been vastly reduced from what they were even five years ago. Some members of the FDLR leadership participated in the Rwandan genocide, and the group clings to a racist, anti-Tutsi "Hutu power" ideology. While the FDLR no longer has the capacity to pose a serious threat to Kigali, it is important to remember the lens through which the leadership there views it. Many Rwandans, particularly Tutsis, are still deeply traumatized by the events of the 1994 genocide, as any community would be. What can seem to outsiders to be an irrational fear that an anti-Tutsi attempt at ethnic cleansing will happen again is at the front of Rwandan policymakers' minds in all their decisions about what to do in the DRC. The FDLR also

sometimes serves as a convenient bogeyman for Rwandan leaders who want to justify intervention in the DRC.

Second, Congolese Rwandaphones and Rwandans share an interest in maintaining access to the region's rich natural resources, particularly in the minerals sector. Rwanda has very limited mineral resources in its own territory and has for more than a decade maintained the fiction that most of the minerals it exports are Rwandan, though they are actually of Congolese origin. While Rwanda's looting of the Congo during the 1998-2002 war was quite open and well-documented, its efforts in the period since have been significantly more subtle, and involve relying on the CNDP as a partner Congolese Rwandaphone armed group to control trade routes and mines, and to unofficially tax border traffic for both its own and Kigali's benefit. In return, Kigali has supplied the CNDP with funding and other forms of support. Even after the 2009 CNDP integration agreement, this arrangement persisted, with Ntaganda at the helm of ex-CNDP efforts to maintain its own and Rwanda's access to Congolese resources.

Third, Rwandaphones want to secure a base of long-term political power in the region in order to protect the interests outlined above. The Congolese state is predatory, and holding a position of political power equates to the right to loot state resources and distribute them to one's supporters and ethnic brethren. For Kigali, having friendly political leadership in the region means that it can be more confident in the safety of Rwandaphone Congolese as well as maintaining access to mineral and other trade revenues.

Rwandan intervention in the DRC is a significant source of problems, but the grievances of Rwandaphone Congolese would likely find violent expression even in the absence of such a powerful external ally. Whether they would be as successful is another question. In initial fighting in April and May 2012, M23 forces were quite weak against the FARDC forces deployed against them, and the mutineers were quickly pushed back to a mountainous region of North Kivu bordering Rwanda. It was only when Rwanda provided substantial support and manpower that M23 became powerful enough to advance on Goma.

The international response to the M23 crisis was tepid at best. While the U.N. Security Council and various Western powers issued strongly worded statements condemning M23 and its backers, they did little to stop the fighting or to address the root causes of the conflict. Regional diplomatic efforts initially focused on getting the two sides to talks, which are currently at a stalemate in Kampala. Simultaneous to the Kampala talks, there have also been U.N. efforts to broker a framework agreement for regional stability, which is supposed to be signed in late February. It is far from clear that this deal will actually solve the problems underlying the M23 crisis, however; root issues of grievances over land rights, the protection of Congolese Rwandaphones and the mineral trade are not addressed in the framework as it currently stands. Instead, the framework focuses on regional actors, coordination of donor state efforts and strengthening the DRC government.

Rwanda's alleged involvement in the crisis drew a great deal of media attention, especially after reports surfaced that the United States Mission to the United Nations might have tried to block publication of parts of the Group of Experts reports that outlined Rwandan support for the M23. The U.S. Mission strenuously denied these accusations, but information about Rwanda's role was leaked prior to the Group of Experts reports being published, suggesting that someone was afraid that publication would be blocked one way or another. In response, several donor states suspended development funding and budgetary support to Rwanda, and only limited funding has been restored in the interim. There is no question that, in the short term, the suspension of aid hurts Rwanda, which is reliant upon international aid for a significant portion of its budget. However, the measures do not seem to have shamed Rwanda into suspending its support for the M23; Kigali continues to deny involvement.

Diplomacy is important to resolving the DRC's crises, but underlying the situation is the basic problem of Congolese security: the government's lack of control over its eastern territories. In



such an environment, armed groups are bound to multiply regardless of the presence or absence of outside support. There is widespread agreement among diplomats, scholars and activists that security sector reform must be the top priority for the DRC. Efforts to improve the quality and professionalism of FARDC forces are already underway, but poor governance and leadership may yet interfere with what reforms have already been undertaken.

A case in point: In the initial fight against M23, the FARDC's U.S.-trained 391st Battalion deployed to North Kivu in July and by all accounts fought well alongside members of the well-trained and well-equipped Presidential Guard. More remarkably by the FARDC's usual abysmal standards, the 391st does not appear to have engaged in significant human rights violations against civilian populations. The success of the 391st Battalion is thus a model for what is possible in security sector reform through bilateral cooperation.

Yet when the suddenly much stronger and larger M23 forces began their advance on Goma later in the year, neither the 391st nor the Presidential Guard played a significant role in the FARDC's defense. Why then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Gabriel Amisi, since suspended from his post, and the political leaders who theoretically oversee him decided to remove their best fighters at the time of Goma's greatest vulnerability is anyone's guess. But the decision to do so clearly demonstrates that ineffective leadership can undermine even very effective security sector reform efforts. Moreover, such leadership threatens to undercut stability in the rest of Congo, where citizens are weary of their leaders' incompetence, corruption and malfeasance.

The path to peace in the eastern DRC requires simultaneous and coordinated action at the domestic, regional and international levels. Domestically, stronger leadership with a serious commitment to security sector and other kinds of reform is desperately needed, both at the federal and local echelons. Many of the local grievances driving fighting in the east -- especially those involving smaller armed groups that get little attention in the world press -- have never been resolved. International actors can play a major role in facilitating peace-building efforts at the grassroots level. Doing so would go a long way toward alleviating concerns in Rwanda and among Congolese Rwandaphones about the ways instability in the Kivus affects Rwandaphone populations there. It might also finally eradicate the FDLR as a threat -- real or perceived -- to Rwandan security.

Even under such an idealized scenario, however, many more problems remain to be solved. Rwanda's interest in Congolese natural resources is unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future, but professionalizing the Kivu mineral sector -- which is currently mostly unregulated, artisanal mining -- would be a good first step. Addressing real grievances, diversifying the economy and establishing real control over territory while simultaneously making the Congolese state less predatory and more protective of its citizens will not be easy, but it is the only way to stop groups like the M23 from rising up, year after year. □

# U.N.'S 'INTERVENTION BRIGADE' RAISES COST OF INTERFERENCE IN DRC

BY RICHARD GOWAN

08 APR 2013

Policy discussions about peacekeeping frequently get bogged down in technical details, such as the wording of United Nations resolutions, rather than tackling big strategic questions. This has been true of most commentary on the U.N. Security Council's decision in late-March to mandate an "intervention brigade" to "neutralize and disarm" armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). There has been a lot of talk about the council's unusually aggressive language, and less about the new brigade's role in the complex political struggle for access to the DRC's natural resources.

Peacekeeping experts are excited that the council has directed the new brigade -- which will be part of the existing U.N. operation in the DRC, MONUSCO -- to undertake "targeted offensive operations" against militias. Although U.N. forces have gone on the offensive in the past, the council has not authorized a peace-enforcement mission in such explicit terms before. This has made some regular military contributors to blue helmet operations, apparently including India and Pakistan, nervous. In an effort to reassure them, the Security Council specified that this is "exceptional" and creates no precedents.

As if to prove this point, the U.N. Secretariat has strongly argued that any potential blue helmet mission in Mali should not be responsible for counterterrorist operations. Instead, a French-led "parallel force" will mop up against Islamist groups, at least for the rest of this year. The U.N. is in no particular hurry to switch from peacekeeping to war-fighting there.

While the new brigade in the DRC, which has a maximum projected strength of just more than 3,000 personnel, could end up doing some hard fighting, this may actually be a distraction from its real strategic purpose: to deter some central African powers, most notably Rwanda, which have a history of fueling proxy wars in the DRC from further destabilizing the region.

On paper the U.N. brigade's primary target is the [M23 militia](#), a Tutsi group that outmaneuvered MONUSCO troops to seize the city of Goma last November. But since then, M23 has been riven by in-fighting; the leader of the losing faction, Bosco Ntaganda, surrendered to the International Criminal Court last month. The group is now estimated to have just 1,500 fighters left.

Defeating M23 decisively would still not necessarily be easy. The militia's fighters know the terrain in the eastern DRC and have demonstrated military skill. The recent brief war in the Central African Republic, in which rebels toppled the government and killed 13 South African soldiers, demonstrated what a determined militia force can achieve.

Many Western officials are also skeptical about how effective the intervention brigade will be. They question whether some of the countries that are expected to contribute -- including Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania -- can deploy sufficiently effective units. South Africa will also be in-

volved, but its losses in the CAR, which have precipitated fierce public attacks on the government, may make it more wary of any risky maneuvers.

It is too early to conclude that the DRC intervention brigade is a paper tiger. At a minimum, the intervention force is likely to be more impressive than the Congolese army, which has failed to stabilize eastern DRC while committing repeated human rights abuses. The African Union force in Somalia has rebounded from severe losses in firefights with Islamist forces, including the loss of more than 70 Burundian troops in a single battle, to win some significant victories. The brigade in the DRC may not be required to face such dangers, however, as the Congolese government is already in negotiations with M23. The creation of the new force should at least create an additional incentive for M23 to accept a deal.

So the intervention brigade is an element in a diplomatic game, but this game extends beyond the immediate problem of what to do with M23. The key player is Rwanda, which is generally believed to have assisted and exploited M23 and a number of previous militia forces to assert its influence over the resource-rich eastern DRC. Similar charges have been leveled at Uganda. Facing mounting international opprobrium after the fall of Goma, the two countries, along with other governments in the region, signed up to a new “peace, security and cooperation framework” for the DRC. This paved the way for the U.N. brigade, which has been under discussion since mid-2012.

The brigade also makes most sense in this regional context. However effective the African troops under U.N. command are on the ground, where they are supposed to tackle not only M23 but also a variety of other militias, they represent a deterrent to Rwanda and Uganda. If M23 or another rebellious force with clear links to Kigali and Kampala were to launch new offensives and kill Tanzanian or South African personnel, it would spark a regional crisis. In the past, militia commanders backed by Rwanda were able to maneuver around U.N. units, most of which came from far-off places like South Asia and Latin America, but the new brigade is a tripwire force that cannot be treated so lightly.

Focusing on the terms of the brigade’s mandate is, therefore, misleading. Its main contribution is to raise the potential strategic costs of interfering in the DRC for some of its neighbors. The countries that have offered to contribute to the brigade also have interests in how the DRC’s resources are managed. The U.N. has essentially offered African powers an opportunity to manage the inevitable competition for the DRC’s wealth less chaotically.

The presence of the intervention brigade will also give the U.N. extra leverage over the Congolese government led by President Joseph Kabila, who has all too often treated MONUSCO with suspicion and contempt. Kinshasa may now need to take the U.N. presence in DRC as a whole more seriously, and make more serious efforts to build decent governance systems in eastern DRC than it has to date. To drive this message home, the Security Council has announced that it will review the intervention brigade’s mandate after a year.

Rwanda appears to have acquiesced to this approach, at least for now: As a temporary member of the Security Council, it voted for the brigade. Nonetheless, many regional experts ask whether this rapprochement will last. If hostilities in the eastern DRC escalate again, 3,000 extra U.N. troops are not going to manage the crisis whatever the precise wording of their mandate says. □

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